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THE PATHETIC FALLACY IN EARLY LATIN POETRY

BY

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
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The material for the following discussion has been collected by the reading of all Roman poets--whether important or of minor rank--from Ennius through the Augustan Age.

The Pathetic Fallacy in Early Latin Poetry
from Ennius to the End of the Augustan Age.

I.

Introduction.

John Ruskin is probably the first writer of literary importance who undertook to discuss at length that literary form of poetic expression which he termed the Pathetic Fallacy. In his "Modern Painters" (1) he devotes considerably more than a chapter to describing the pathetic fallacy, but without precisely defining it.

Fallacy is of two principal kinds, he points out. "Either it is the fallacy of wilful fancy, which involves no real expectation that it will be believed; or else it is a fallacy caused by an excited state of the feelings, making us, for the time more or less irrational." (2) It is with the latter that we are here chiefly concerned, and one example of each type, taken from English literature, will suffice as illustration.

"The spendthrift crocus, bursting through the mold
Naked and shivering, with his cup of gold."

"Here is something pleasurable," believes Ruskin, in written poetry which is nevertheless untrue," (3) and this elaborate instance of personification he calls a "cheating of the fancy."

1. Ruskin, Modern Painters 1904, Vol. 3 pp. 161-177

2. op.cit.-p164

3. ibid.

But, in Alton Locke,--

"They rowed her in across the rolling foam--
The cruel, crawling foam."

Thus he explains: "The foam is not cruel, neither does it crawl. The state of mind which attributes to it these characters of a living creature is one in which the reason is unhinged by grief. All violent feelings have the same effect. They produce in us a falseness in our impressions of external things, which I would generally characterize as the Pathetic Fallacy." (1)

His general view of the matter is this: "That the temperament which is subject to the pathetic fallacy is that of a mind or body overborne by feeling, and too weak (for the time) to deal fully and truthfully with what is before them or upon them." He points out that "this state is more or less noble according to the force and elevation of the emotion which has caused it; but at its best, if the poet is so overpowered as to color his descriptions by it, then it is morbid and a sign of weakness. For the emotions have vanquished the intellect." "It is," he says, "a higher order of mind, in which the intellect rises and asserts itself along with the utmost tension of passion and when the whole man can stand in an iron glow, white hot perhaps, but still strong, and in no wise evaporating; even if he melts, losing none of his weight." (2) Mr. Ruskin further states: "There are four classes of men -the men who feel nothing, and therefore see truly. The men who feel strongly, think weakly and see untruly (the second order of poets).

1. op. cit- p.165

2. op. cit- p.167-168

The men who feel strongly, think strongly, and see truly (first order of poets). And the men who, strong as human creatures can be are yet submitted to influences stronger than they, and see in a sort untrue, because what they see is inconceivably above them." This last he calls "the usual condition of prophetic inspiration." (1) These classes "of course are united each to the other by imperceptible transitions, and the same mind, according to the influence to which it is subjected, passes at different times into the various states. Still, the difference between the great and lesser man is, on the whole, chiefly in this point of alterability. (2) Furthermore, "so long as we see that the feeling (which induces the Pathetic Fallacy) is true, we pardon, or are even pleased by, the confessed fallacy of sight which it induces... But the moment the mind of the speaker becomes ^{cold} untrue, as being forever untrue in the external facts." (3)

But how, may one ask, is the reader to know with any degree of definiteness when the mind of the poet, or character represented by him, is or has become cold? And how is one to determine with an appreciable degree of certainty whether or not a pathetic fallacy is clearly induced by some powerful mood or emotion? An attempt to answer these questions, the indirect purpose of this thesis, I shall further embody in my definition of the pathetic fallacy.

1. op. cit. p. 167-168
2. op. cit. p. 168-169
3. ibid.

In conclusion, Mr. Ruskin states that the pathetic fallacy "is powerful only so far as it is pathetic, feeble so far as it is fallacious, and, therefore, that the dominion of truth is entire, over this, as over every other natural and just state of the mind." (1)

Commenting on Mr. Ruskin's view of the matter, Dr. J. C. Shairp, in his "Poetic Interpretation of Nature," says: "It will be conceded to Mr. Ruskin that it is not the highest order of poet who, as he looks out on Nature, is so overmastered by his emotions as to be continually coloring it with his own mental hues. It is higher to feel intensely and still think truly, than merely to feel intensely without true thought. But Mr. Ruskin would allow that for the poet, whether dramatic, epic, or other to represent his characters as coloring the world with their own excited feelings, is neither falsity nor weakness, but is merely keeping true to a fact of human nature," (2)

The aesthetic side of the pathetic fallacy need not deeply concern us here. I believe we may no more hope to realize an absolute definition of the pathetic fallacy, embodying its true aesthetic significance, than of the literary genus Poetry. Whether the pathetic fallacy is beautiful or true, whether it is a sign of strength or weakness on the part of the poet, thus denoting the superior or inferior poet, or whether it is merely "keeping true to a fact of human nature" is, for the purpose of this thesis, a matter of secondary importance. I shall attempt to show, however, in a following chapter that Dr. Shairp's view has strong foundation.

1. op.cit-p.177

2. Poetic Interpretation of Nature, 1884, p.117

At this point let us consider more precisely what the pathetic fallacy is, and how we are to recognize it. Although it would be practically impossible to furnish a clue-- a key that would open all doors, as it were-- because of the rather complex nature and transitional character of the pathetic fallacy, there is a definite method of observation whereby we may recognize it to an appreciable extent as well as its various stages of transition.

For, after all, Mr. Ruskin has merely ventured to explain the reason for the pathetic fallacy, but, leaving a general view of the problem, has by no means shown us, despite his quoting of various instances, exactly what it is.

I propose, therefore, at first roughly to divide the field of the pathetic fallacy into two groups:

1. The sympathetic fallacy
2. The antipathetic fallacy

These two kinds of fallacy, although they may be induced by the same cause, are really opposite in effect. By a mere change of view point, however, they may in some cases become identical, as I shall show in this chapter. Let us again consider the quotation from Alton Locke which Ruskin quoted:

"They rowed her in across the rolling foam-
The cruel, crawling foam."

He tells that it is an expression of grief-- "of a state of mind in which the reason is unhinged". Perhaps it is. But is there a clear indication within the fallacy itself that the underlying emotion is not fear or cruelty, or even avarice? I mean, does the personality with which the poet endows the foam reflect the mood or emotion of the speaker? On the contrary, the feelings and emotions of the sea are "cruel", "crawling", admitting that the speaker may be filled with

grief, no doubt stricken with a sort of bitterness that causes him to imagine that the sea--perhaps even the whole earth-- is cruel, unfeeling. Ah, no!--the sea does not share his emotions. In fact, his emotion, granting that it is mainly grief, has caused him to consider the sea hostile, heartless, revealing to him emotions sharply opposite to his own. This fallacy, for indeed it is a fallacy, we may designate by the term "antipathetic."

There is a similar, and perhaps even more interesting, instance of such a fallacy in third book of the Aeneid.

Aeneas, when he had come to Thrace after the destruction of Troy, first wishes to celebrate the inception of his labor by decking the altar with leafy boughs before offering sacrifice. As he tears up the green growth of the soil he beholds a portent, and, upon further investigation, the shade of Polydorus, Priam's son who had been murdered here by Polymnestor, King of Thrace, laments and bids him flee.

tertia sed postquam maiore hostilia nisu
adgredior genibusque adversae obluctor harenae
(eloquor an sileam?), gemitus lacrimabilis imo
auditur tumulo, et vox reddita fertur ad auris:
"quid miserum, Aenea, laceras? iam parce sepulto,
parce pias scelerare manus. non me tibi Troia
externum tulit, aut cruor hic de stipite manat
heu! fuge crudelis terras, fuge litus avarum
nam Polydorus ego hic confixum ferrea texit (1)
telorum seges et iaculis increvit acutis."

Here a shade, overcome by grief and pain, mental as well as physical, bids Aeneas flee from a place that had been the scene of treachery, greed and cruelty, as Aeneas explains:

1. Vergil, Aeneid, 3, 37-48

Hunc Polydorum auri quondam cum pondere magno
 infelix Priamusfurtim mandaret alendum
 Threicio regi, cum iam diffideret armis
 Dardaniae cingique urbem obsidione videret.
 ille, ut opes fractae Teucrium et Fortuna recessit,
 res Agamemnonias victriciaeque arma secutus
 fas omne abrumpit; Polydorum obtruncat et auro
 vi potitur, Quid non mortalia cogis,
 auri sacra fames! (1)

In the line: 'heu! fuge crudelis terras, fuge litus
 avarum' we see an instance of the antipathetic fallacy.
 The land is "cruel", the shore is "greedy"--opposite emotions
 caused by a mind and body overpowered with grief and pain. Without
 attempting to avoid a paradox, moreover, we may note that if we view
 this fallacy in the light of the second passage, which serves as
 an explanation of the preceding one, we would find that here we have,
 but perhaps in a minor sense, also a sympathetic fallacy: the land
 and shore are made to reflect, and perhaps sympathize with, the
 cruelty and greed of Polymnestor

But in his tenth Eclogue Vergil, singing the love of his friend
 Gallus for a mistress who had deserted him, shows such deep sympathy
 for him in his (the latter's) grief that he causes Nature to suffer
 sorrow as if humanized.

Quae nemora aut qui vos saltus habuere, puellae
 Naides, indigno cum Gallus amore peribat?
 Nam neque Parnasi vobis iuga, nam neque Pindi
 ulla moram fecere, neque Aoniae Aganippe
 illum etiam lauri, etiam flevere myricae,
 pinifer illum etiam sola sub rupe iacentem
 Maenalus, et gelidi fleverunt saxa Lycaei
 stant et oves circum (nostri nec paenitet illas,
 nec te paeniteat pecoris, divina poeta:
 et formosus ovis ad flumina pavit Adonis); (2)

1.op.cit.-49-57

2.Vergil, Eclogue 10, 9-18

"For him even the laurels, even the tamarisks wept (l.13)
 For him, as he lay beneath a lonely rock, even pine-
 crowned Maenalus wept, and the crags of cold Lycaeus.
 The sheep, too----think no shame of us,----"

Here we see reflected in Nature the loneliness (sola--rupe, l.14) and grief (flewerunt, l. 15) of Gallus as viewed through the sympathetic eyes of his friend Vergil. This is therefore a "sympathetic" fallacy, in effect the direct opposite of what we termed "anti-pathetic", although both of these are induced by a violent, and perhaps even the same, emotion or poignant mood.

And so, conceding to Mr. Ruskin that such fallacies are induced by a violent emotion or deep mood, either that of the poet himself or that which, for artistic reasons, he ascribes to one of his characters, we ask: what is the relation between the emotion or mood and the resulting pathetic fallacy? And, how are we to discern an instance of this fallacy? In the first place, we must be perfectly aware when the poet, or any of his characters, is under the influence of a definite mood or emotion. Then, the pathetic fallacy, if it is to be considered such, must reveal a reflection in some inanimate or brute object of that same, or an opposite mood, or emotion. Thus the emotion revealed within the pathetic fallacy will be easily identified, or contrasted with the emotion or mood of the poet, or of his characters.

That the pathetic fallacy is induced not by emotion alone, but is also a result of a latent sense of sympathy between man, the poet being the voice or instrument, as it were, of mankind-- and Nature, or the outer world in general; and that its expression, spontaneous or premeditated, is (as a poetic endowing of Nature in which the human soul, in some aspect, sees itself reflected) not unjustifiable I shall try to show in a later chapter. For the present, at least,

I should define the pathetic fallacy as a poetic form of expression, spontaneous or premeditated, revealing a sympathetic, or perhaps an antipathetic, reflection of a mood or emotion of the poet or of any of his characters in some external, non-human field.

Connected with the pathetic fallacy, but as its antithesis and particularly in the way of contrast, is what I may call the Apathetic Reality. This is undoubtedly a premeditated form- a realistic yet poetic method of accentuating, for artistic purposes, the infiniteness and inhumaneness of Nature; that side of Nature which yields no response to man's yearnings and refuses to make itself plastic under even the strongest power of emotion. For "outside of and beyond man, aloof from his warm hopes and fears, his joy and sorrow, his strivings and aspirations, there lies the vast immensity of Nature's forces, which pays him no homage and yields him no sympathy. This aspect of Nature may be seen even in the tamest landscape, if we look to the clouds or the stars above us, or to the ocean waves that roar around our shores. Man's heart may be full of gladness, yet Nature frowns: he goes forth to the death chamber and Nature affronts him with sunshine and the song of birds." (1)

This inhuman and perhaps real aspect of Nature the poet sees with a clear eye and calm mind, at the same time employing it in his poem as a setting which contrasts with poignancy a violent emotion or deep mood which he or his characters experience. But it is when the mind falters before the force of violent emotion and the eyes sees falsely that this impassiveness and apathy of Nature is interpreted by the poet or his characters as hostility or

antipathy and gives rise to what I have previously defined and illustrated as the antipathetic fallacy.

An interesting example of the Apathetic Reality is that passage in the Aeneid where Vergil sets off the tumult in the heart of the wronged and lovelorn queen Dido in contrast with the calm and silence of night:-

Nox erat, et placidum carpebant fessa soporem
 corpora per terras, silvaeque et saeva quierant
 aequora, cum medio volvuntur sidera lapsu
 cum tacet omnis ager, pecudes pictaeque volucres,
 quaeque latus late liquidos, quaeque aspera dumis
 rura tenent, somno positae sub nocte silenti
 (lenibant curas et corda oblita laborum)
 at non infelix animi Phoenissa, neque ~~um~~quam
 solvitur in somnos, oculisve aut pectore noctem
 accipit; ingeminant curae, rursus que resurgens
 saevit amor, magnoque irarum fluctuat aestu. (1)

The peaceful quiet of the night. All Nature is sunk in calm sleep; even the weary creatures, the woods and wild seas," when all the land is still,..are couched in sleep beneath the silent night.... But not so the unhappy Dido; she never sinks to sleep, nor draws the night into her eyes and breast; her pangs redouble and her love, swelling, surges forth anew, as the mighty tides of passion clash within her".

One is struck by the modern tone of this passage, for it seems that it might have been written by a poet of the nineteenth century. This contrast between Nature's calm and the souls' tumult certainly must belong, one thinks, to a late and self-conscious age. Among the English poets, the pathetic fallacy, as well as the apathetic reality, has often been treated by Byron, Keats, Shelly, Tennyson and others,-one may readily observe- to enhance the emotional effect of a setting, by representing Nature in a mood corresponding to, or contrasting with the human one which the poet wishes to represent.

In such instances fallacies are obviously premeditated literary forms. That there are other and spontaneous instances, to be sure, leaving a different and perhaps stronger impression upon the reader is equally obvious, but for the purposes of this thesis, I must forego strict distinction of such a nature, which can be based only on analysis that must seem often unduly subjective.

Perhaps it is because of the frequent employing of these fallacies by the modern poets that they have been termed characteristically modern and romantic. But the term 'romantic' has been subject to so many different interpretations that it may be said to lose its value somewhat for the interpreting of the results of my investigation; indeed, it may confuse rather than illuminate. Yet if, at any rate, the terms "romantic" and "modern", in reference to poetic expression, are to be considered only as peculiarly synonymous, then I may maintain with confidence that such "modern" or "romantic" elements are not lacking in the poetry of classical antiquity.

Chapter II.

The religion of a people is inextricably woven in the thread of its daily life; and the life of the Greeks and Romans was greatly colored by survivals of a primitive belief in animism. This belief found its expression in a man-sided religious life filled with cult and ritual, full of divinities, petty or terrible, but generally vague and ill-defined. "When," asks Augustine, "can I ever mention in one passage of this book all the names of gods and goddesses, which they have been able to compass in great volumes, seeing that they allot to every individual thing the special function of some divinity?"(1)

1. C. D. 4,8

These spirits or daemones who inhabited the woodland countryside, in fact, the entire realm of Nature, we may know better in art and poetry. "Faunus lover of fugitive nymphs" may have been a pretty conceit expressed by Horace, but "it is quite probable that the rustics took the fauns, nymphs and satyrs seriously. (1) "Trees", says Pliny, "were temples of divinities, and in the old way the simple country folk to this day dedicate any remarkable tree to a god. Nor have we more worship for images glittering with gold and ivory than for groves and the very silence that is in them. (2) These spirits, invisible and impersonal, possessed material bodies, they believed, shadowy no doubt, and subtle, and impalpable, and carried on an existence of their own. To the early Roman mind they were indeed real, possessing human moods, emotions and activities.

Traces of animism were for a long time noticeable at Rome, especially among the peasants. The ex-voto offerings found in springs and groves, the worship of the lares and penates, the offerings that Horace so sympathetically encourages among the simple people of the Sabine hills, the ease with which even the state officials could create "abstract" deities out of mere daylight experiences-all these prove that animism was not far off. And it is the same psychology which makes possible animism in religion and "sympathy between man and Nature" in poetry. Vergil in the Georgics and Shelley in "The Sensitive Plant" are simply employing imagination so as to re-experience something that we have none of us far outgrown. (3)

1. T. R. Glover, The Conflict of Religion in the Early Roman Empire, 1909, p. 12

2. Pliny, N.H. 12, 3

3. Tenney Frank, in Class Jour. Vol. 11, May, 1916, p. 485

But in the course of time Greek myths killed Roman animism, just as Greek rationalism had killed the myths. After the "religious panic" of the Second Punic War, as Fowler calls it, the cultured Roman was no naive primitive. A gulf of cold fact soon closed in between man and Nature. (1) Every educated Roman was, if not a believer in Epicurean theories of Atomism, at least not unaware of their existence and their implications. It would therefore, have been childish to seek to retain or perhaps to revive, in a religious sense, the mood of animism.

Yet even if the mood of animism is revived by the Latin poets solely for literary effect, it is to this revival or "make-believe" that we ^{owe} that immensely beautiful poetic expression of Nature which Matthew Arnold calls "natural magic", (2) which J. A. K. Thomson terms, in part, Barbarism, (3) and which entrances us partly because somewhere in us there sleeps a memory of miracles wrought in days when every rock and tree and river was alive with supernatural force. And it was perhaps this feeling for nature that caused the great Shelly to write in a sonnet:

Little we see in Nature that is ours;
 Great God! I'd rather be
 A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
 So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
 Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
 Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
 Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn. (4)

1. Tenney Frank, Fortunatus et Ille, in Class. Jour., 11 May, 1916 p. 585
2. Matthew Arnold, On the Study of Celtic Literature, 1903, p. 136
3. J. A. K. Thomson, Greeks and Barbarians, 1921, p. 148
4. Wordsworth's Complete Poetical Works, Cambridge Edition, 1904 p. 349

And although there was little in this belief to awaken in the early Romans sympathies and affections with regard to the surrounding world, among the Latin poets, however, the imaginative and literary recreation of this belief, which I may characterize as Animization, induced a poetic treatment of nature in some respects, at least as diversified as among the poets of any period. The Roman poets, however showed tendencies unlike those of modern extremists because they were more dependent upon literary convention in the treatment of their themes and the selection of their forms. Yet a poet is by his very nature primarily subjective; "he may deal with objective things but, endowed with the divine gift of the imagination, he must feel himself in touch with the heart of the world; he must have a temperament sensitive and fine, a temper^ament shot with luminous and delicate threads of feeling!"⁽¹⁾ In short, a poet must be, in a sense, "romantic."

Yet perhaps not all the modern "romantic" expressions of Nature may be found in Latin poetry, and only under the stress of emotion does the poet's outlook become changed and his strong sense of reason and restraint falter before the force of his emotion. Although Nature herself is but rarely the subject of poetic mysticism, at times even the modern note of the sympathetic sense for a moment appears upon the horizon, but is soon lost in a more or less restrained treatment of a subject which is, for the poet, prescribed by literary convention.

1. Mona Pearl Hodnett, The Sea in Roman Poetry, (Master's Thesis 1918) p. 12

The Roman poet was chiefly interested in man and his desires and ambitions: the Romans were an objective people; woven in the texture of their thoughts were pictures of war, vast empire, government and laws. Besides, the Romans, as contrasted with the Greeks, were utilitarian. They were as a people, rather unobservant of Nature and uninterested in natural science and in all that seemed to have^{no} practical bearing. "The cold seriousness of the Romans, their matter-of-fact good sense, the inflexibility of their language with its limited sentence structure, together with their realistic tendency did not allow their feeling for Nature to proceed in very full measure."⁽¹⁾ They did not commune with Nature, linking their souls with hers, nor did they gather from her light of the moral and spiritual world. The more comprehensive view of Nature as a whole, which belongs rather to thought and reflection than to feeling and passion, is to be more easily found in the philosophers than in the poets of the ancient world. These are perhaps the reasons why the the Roman poets are indicted by critics for failing to express the "sense of sympathy between man and nature," and for having known little of "that sense of grandeur and mystery" which is perhaps the most prominent characteristic of modern poetry. But this decision need not be taken as final in regard to the ancient poets, because on account of their literary convention their expression, thus of necessity limited, cannot be considered as an adequate indication of the extent of their emotional nature.

1. Allen, The Treatment of Nature in the Poetry of the Roman Republic, Madison, Wis., 1899, pp. 215-216

But, to grasp the relation between Animization and the Pathetic Fallacy, let us turn to Vergil's Georgics. There the husbandman nurtures and fondles the tender plants as though they were living creatures. He gives them water, 'the air's searching breath' steals in, and 'the plants take courage'; he overlays them with stones and jars of heavy weight, thus protecting them against the time 'when the sultry dog-star splits the fields that gape with thirst'; he forms canes, rods and stakes on which 'they learn to mount and scorn the winds'; he spares their tenderness and while 'the shoots push joyously forward' he does not prune them with a knife-'for they shrink under the steel'- but picks them with his fingers. (1)

Here objects in nature actually live: they exhibit feelings, emotions, desires,- an extraordinary instance of Animization. That such an apparently fantastic expression is to some extent justifiable even from a scientific standpoint has been recently shown experimentally by Prof. Jagadis Chunder Bose, the eminent Hindoo botanist, in regard to organic and inorganic objects, particularly in the instance of plants. He has shown that "plants exhibit many of the activities which we have been accustomed to associate only with animal life. In the one case, as in the other, stimulus of any kind will induce a responsive thrill. There are rhythmic tissues in the plant which, like those in the animal, go on throbbing ceaselessly..... A time comes when, after an answer to a supreme shock, there is a sudden end of the plant's power to give any further response.....

1. Vergil, Georgics 2, 346-370

These, our mute companions, silently growing beside our door, have now told us their life tremulousness and their death spasm in script that is as inarticulate as they. May it not be said that this, their story, has a pathos of its own beyond any that we have conceived?" (1)

May it not also be said that the truth of the scientific revelations of Prof. Bose justifies to some extent, at least the greatest primitive belief, or shall we say, instinctive superstition of man? Is it not, besides an indication of the potency or the true poetic genius in its dealing with the unknown, and does it not suggest that a greater Truth, perhaps never to be discovered by science alone, holds sway over the life of mankind and the natural world to which he is bound in mutual service?

Prof. Bose, then teaches us that plants feel, - are sensitive, because they respond to physical stimuli. As to whether they have our sense of sympathy and the higher emotions we do not know. And as long as we remain in ignorance of these things we must regard all poetic attribution of human expression to inanimate objects as possibly true but apparently fallacious.

At this point we may return to our original topic Animization, and observe its relation to the Pathetic Fallacy. We turn to Vergil again. In the case of the joys and sorrows of trees, flowers and rocks that the shepherds sang of upon the death and apotheosis of Daphnis, emotions that reflect the shepherds' own emotions, we find in the following two remarkable passages, illustrations of the pathetic fallacy.

1. J. C. Bose, Plant -Autographs, in the Annual Report Smithsonian Institution, 1914, p. 442

extinctum nymphae crudeli funere Daphnim
 flebant (vos coryli testes et flumina Nymphis),
 cum complexa sui corpus miserabile nati
 atque deos atque astra vocat crudelia mater.
 non ulli pastos illis egere diebus
 frigida, Daphni, boves ad flumina; nulla neque amnen (25)
 libavit quadripes nec graminis attigit herbam.
 Daphni, tuum Poenos etiam ingemuisse loones
 interitum montesque feri silvaeque loquuntur.

.....
postquam te Fata tulerunt
 ipsa Pales agros atque ipse reliquit Apollo. (25)
 grandia saepe quibus mandavimus hordea sulcis,
 infelix lolium et steriles nascuntur avenae;
 pro molli viola, pro purpureo narcisso
 carduus et spinis surgit paliurus acutis.
 spargite humum foliis, inducite fontibus umbras, (40)
 pastores (mandat fieri sibi talia Daphnis),
 et tumulum facite et tumulo superaddite carmen:
 'Daphnis ego in silvis, hinc usque ad sidera notus,
 formosi pecoris custos, formosior ipse'. (1)

Here all Nature mourns: beasts forget to eat or drink (l.25 and 26); the mountains and woods say that even African lions moaned (l.27 and 28); Pales and Apollo leave the fields (l.35); unfruitful dandelion and barren oat-straws spring up instead of grain (l.36 and 37); thistles and thorns take the place of the violet and narcissus (l. 38 and 39)

This passage is followed by another: 'Daphnis I will exalt to the stars; me, too, Daphnis loved,' (2) sang the shepherd Menalcas.

Candidus insuetum miratur limen Olympi
 sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis
 ergo alacris silvas et cetera rura voluptas
 Panemque pastoresque tenet Dryadasque puellas.
 nec lupo insidias pecori nec retia cervis (60)
 ulla dolum meditantur; amat bonus otia Daphnis.
 ipsi laetitia voces ad sidera iactant
 intonsi montes; ipsae iam carmina rupes,
 ipsa sonant arbusta; 'deus, deus ille, Menalca!'
 Sis bonus o felixque tuis! en quattuor atas: (65)
 ecce duas tibi, Daphni, duas altaria Phoebus. (3)

1. Vergil, *Georgics*, 2, 346-370
2. Vergil, *Eclogue* 5, 52
3. Ibid., 55-56

Daphnis is filled with wonder when he reaches Heaven: ergo(1.58), the woods, all the countryside are filled with 'frolic glee'. Even the wolf becomes peaceful: 'Kindly Daphnis loves peace'. Yea, the very mountains, the rocks, the groves rejoice, flinging their voices in song to the stars: 'A god is he, a god, Menalcas!'

Thus far we have witnessed in Vergil instances of Animization and the Pathetic Fallacy. Hence we may surmise that the underlying belief, sincere or pretended, in animism, makes way for and in a sort justifies the expression, under force of a poignant mood or violent emotion, of the pathetic fallacy: such a fallacy, with the presupposition of animism, seems rather natural and unstrained, since the poet, apparently freed temporarily from the restraint of reason, unconsciously perhaps falls into his primitive self, recognizes for the time life in Nature, and hence, concomitant human expression. Also, implied and invisible feelings and emotions in Nature may seem visible to poets through a poetic interpretation of accidental and temporary changes in physical appearances of objects in Nature, appearances which, being originally imagined symbols of human moods or emotions, are for the moment interpreted as actual emotional expressions.

The 'pathetic' interpretation of such appearances, for the sake of a desired effect, when the poet is not clearly moved by a mood or emotion, is a literary conceit- a 'cheating of the fancy,' as Ruskin would say. When such an interpretation is caused, however, by the effect upon the mind of a powerful emotion, and is 'in sympathy with' or shows apathy towards the poet's or his hero's mood or emotion, actual or pretended, it is what we have called the Pathetic fallacy. We may therefore hazard the following definition as final: A poetic

form of expression, spontaneous or premeditated, that is in effect such an interpretation of a temporary change in appearance of an inanimate or brute object or natural phenomenon as to reveal either a sympathetic or antipathetic reflection of a mood or emotion of the poet or of his characters.

Chapter III.

"That the Roman poet does not often personalize the creatures of nature is quite true,"(1) asserts one scholar. This statement needs further explanation, it seems to me, before it may be fully accepted. Let us first observe that literary form known as personification, which is the clothing of an inanimate thing or abstraction with human personality. The most cursory reader of the classics will admit that personification, both of abstractions and inanimate things, is more or less frequently employed by Vergil, Ovid, and other poets in the sense that objects or abstractions are treated for the moment as possessing personality and represented as persons in action. Often only a personifying epithet is used, an epithet which is strictly applicable only to a person, as "envious night" or "greedy waves". The poet may, however, prolong his personification into a more detailed characterization. Perhaps the most familiar illustration of this is Vergil's description of 'Rumor', (2) his one great example of extended personification.

Ovid's description of personified 'Rumor' (3) is perhaps independent of Vergil's, and, to some extent, more telling. While he clearly personifies Rumor, still he fixes our attention more upon the house of Rumor than upon Rumor herself. This is conceived of as a great "whispering gallery" midway of land, sea and sky, a sort of cen-

1. Tenney Frank, Fortunatus et Ille in Class. Jour., 11 May, 1916 p. 485
2. Vergil, Aen. 4, 1173 ff.
3. Ovid, Met., 12, 39 ff.

tral office for some universal news agency.⁽¹⁾ In the same passage we have minor personifications of Credulity, Error, Joy, Fear, Sedition and Whisperings. In all these, with one exception, the personification is helped out by a vividly characterizing epithet.

Often the Roman poets, particularly Ovid, employ curious half-personifications, in which the poet's imagination, while partially bridging the chasm between the inanimate and the personal, still finds itself unable (or unwilling?) to abandon the inanimate side completely.⁽²⁾

Perhaps just as often objects in nature are personalized, but not so extensively.

Lucretius personifies even his 'first-beginnings':

fiet ut risu tremulo concussa cachinⁿent
et lacrimis salsis unectent ora genasque⁽³⁾

And the winds, the clouds and the sea:

te dea, te fugiunt venti; te nubila caeli
adventumque tuum tibi suavis daedala tellus
summittit flores, tibi rident aequora ponti
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum.⁽⁴⁾

And, again, 'the faithless sea laughing treacherously':

sed quasi naufragiis magnis multisque coortis
disiectare solet magnum mare transtra cavernas
antennam proram malos tonsasque natantis,
per terrarum omnis oras fluitantia aplustra
ut videantur et indicium edant,
infidi maris insidias virisque dolumque
ut vitare velint, neve ullo tempore credant
subdola cum ridet placidi pellacia ponti⁽⁵⁾

1. Frank T. Miller, Some Features of Ovid's Style in Class Jour.
11, June 1916, p. 518
2. Ib. p. 527
3. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 1, 918-920 cf. also 2, 976-978
4. Ibid. 1, 6-9
5. Ibid. 2, 552-559

Catullus personifies, in a simile, the dawn at sea:

Hic qualis flatu placidum mare matutino
 horrificans Zephyrus proclivis incitat undas
 Aurora exoriente vagi sub limine solis,
 quae tarde primum clementi flamine pulsae
 procedunt lenique sonant plangore cachinni,
 Post vento crescente magis increbescunt
 purpureaeque procul nantes a luce refulgent (1)

And Vergil, the ocean:

qualis ubi alterno procurrens gurgite pontus
 nunc ruit ad terram scopulosque superiacit unda
 spumens extremamque sinu perfundit harenam,
 nunc rapidus retro atque aestu revoluta resorbens
 saxa fugit litusque vado labente relinquit. (2)

And a tree being cut down by woodmen:

illa usque minatur
 et tremefacta comam concusso vertice nutat
 vulneribus donec paulatim evicta supremam
 congemuit traxitque iugis avolsa ruinam.

And Ovid endows even a horse with the personality of a brave Roman. A devastating scourge comes upon the earth and the weaker animals are destroyed; the horse's courage and victorious spirit disappears, and now, forgetful of his former glory, he actually groans in his stall, since he fears the approach of such inglorious death.

acer equus quondam magnaeque in pulvere famae
 degenerat palmas veterumque oblitus honorum
 ad praesepe gemit leto moriturus inert (3)

This may, on the other hand, be considered an exaggerated reality and denote, perhaps, the intimacy of feeling between the Roman warrior and his horse. That even dumb animals react more or less

1. Cat., 64, 269-275

2. Vergil, Aen 11, 624-628

3. Ovid, Met., 7, 542-545

intelligently to outside forces is, of course, unquestionable, but one hesitates, except in poetry, to interpret their reactions in human terms.

In the passage last quoted there is a slight hint of what may be called an intentional pathetic fallacy that is quite modern. No doubt the poet desired to accentuate the mood of the picture, in order to arouse in us an appreciation of his effective description of the scourge and the havoc it wrought in its wake. But in that case we must suppose that he himself was deeply moved by the mental image that he was translating into language.

I have given at random these examples of personification of objects or phenomena of nature, although that literary form in itself merits more complete investigation, and I feel quite certain that the nature of the personification, its literary or poetic value, and its relation to Animization and other forms depends entirely and separately upon the belief and personality of the poet.

For example, Lucretius is not 'cheating' his or our fancy when he speaks of 'the faithless sea laughing treacherously.'⁽¹⁾ Lucretius is not here influenced so much by his emotion or poetic imagination as by his philosophic conviction. He believed the sea actually was unfriendly to man. In his 'De Rerum Natura' he denies all supernatural agency, attributes consciousness, will and passion to the great creative power of nature, the source of all life, joy, beauty and art. His personification of the sea is therefore metaphorical, no doubt, but it cannot, it seems to me, be called 'a cheating of the fancy'.

1. Cf. note 3 on p. 19

That he thought the sea treacherous is quite certain; it is also just as likely that he expected his reader to agree with him.

Vergil, I have noticed, uses personification primarily in similes, to illustrate and accentuate action. Accordingly, he attributes metaphorically and boldly verbs of action to objects in nature primarily for artistic effect, and particularly to strengthen the action in a scene. Moreover, it is usually difficult to decide whether he means an object or phenomenon of Nature or the divinity, possessing human feelings and capable of human activities, residing in, and presiding over, it.

At this point it is well to attempt to differentiate between that literary form which I termed animization and the one we are now discussing. In Animization the poet attributes sensibilities, feelings and emotions to objects in nature, perhaps presupposing an individual spirit or daemon in every object without attempting to differentiate between the spirit and the object, although it was supposed that these spirits were physical beings. In the instance of the passage, from Vergil's Georgics, quoted on p. 14, in describing the emotional life of plants, Vergil does not for a moment attribute ^{to them} any characteristics which are not, for the believer in animism, natural to plants. Personification, on the other hand, is usually a metaphorical description of an object in terms of action that is applicable only to persons.

That there is any relation between Personification, as a literary form and the pathetic fallacy I cannot find evidence. That it is possible to deduce some relation between the pathetic fallacy and personifying epithets applied to inanimate objects I shall attempt to show in a following chapter.

According to a popular interpretation of mythology, myths may be generally considered a personification to the controlling forces of nature, forces personified at first as incorporeal gods; but these gods, having ages ago, it was believed, undergone anthropomorphism, figured in myth as men of like passions with mortals, but with greater power. But even more interesting evidence of the supernatural are the stories of metamorphoses, Hellenistic tales popularized, among the Romans, particularly by Ovid in his Metamorphoses; a romantic description of those miraculous changes rehearsed in Greek and Roman mythology, all the way from the first great metamorphosis, when chaos became an orderly universe, down to the very age of the poet himself, when the soul of Julius Caesar was changed to a star and set in the heavens among the immortals. Ovid's story generally records the change as complete and effective, and this effect is not vitiated but rather enhanced by some characteristic of the new creature, reminiscent of the old, as in the case of Daphne, ⁽¹⁾ whose change into the laurel is indeed complete but not so complete that the gleam of her beauty is lost. This remains in the hard, polished, and glistening leaves of the tree; similarly in the case ^{of} Lycaon; ⁽²⁾ in the case of Mt. Tmolus, however, who in the story becomes Judge Tmolus, we cannot be quite sure whether it is a mountain or judge who is presiding over the contest in music between Apollo and Pan, so incompletely has Ovid conceived the personification of the mountain. ⁽³⁾

1. Ovid, Met. l. 548ff.

2. ibid. l. 232ff.

3. ibid. ll. 157ff.

Ovid often mixes fact and figure. ⁽¹⁾ Thus, Atlas, ⁽²⁾ and Cyane, ⁽³⁾ and Arethusa, ⁽⁴⁾ mountain, pool and stream are still confused with ^{their} several personifications.

Trees have always had, in the minds of men a half-human characteristic. This is true even in our own time, and much more was it the case in the days when any tree trunk might be the lurking place of some shy dryad of the woods, or the actual person of some mortal who had undergone metamorphosis. Thus, the sacred oak of Ceres contains an imprisoned nymph whose blood flows under the ax stroke of Erysichthon, ⁽⁵⁾ and thus Polydorus' blood flows from the sprouted spear-shaft thrust in his body. ⁽⁶⁾ Ovid has himself recorded many metamorphoses of persons into trees: Daphne into a laurel; ⁽⁷⁾ Syrinx into reeds; ⁽⁸⁾ the Heliades into poplars, ⁽⁹⁾ and many others into as many objects. ⁽¹⁰⁾

With all these stories in mind, it was very easy for Ovid to tell the story reversed, of trees not changed to persons, but endowed, like persons, with powers of locomotion and with appreciation of the beauty of Orpheus' music. ⁽¹¹⁾

1. 2,272ff.; 11,157ff.; 12,614ff.; 14,573ff.

2. 4,631

3. 5,409

4. 5,572

5. 8,743

6. Vergil, *Aen* 3, 18ff.

7. *Met.* 1, 542ff.

8. *ibid.* 1, 689ff.

9. *ibid.* 2, 329ff.; 10, 91, 263

10. Cf F.J. Miller, Some Features of Ovid's Style in Class.
Jour. June, 1916, Vol. 11 pp. 513-534

11. *Met.* 10, 86ff

We can, therefore, see how personalization grew to be one of the noticeable characteristics of the ancient aspect of Nature: every animal, tree, flower, river and rock became pregnant with personality. The laurel was Daphne, the flower was Narcissus, Cyane a fountain, Galatea was the summer sea, Arachne the spider and so on. (1)

According to the poets the persons metamorphosed continued to exist as birds or animals or plants, but retained their former human personality. They are usually represented by the different poets in a certain characteristic mood and are thus alluded to, for artistic effect, to arouse a desired mood in the reader, or to accentuate the emotional setting of a scene.

For example, the song of the nightingale, which is poetically called "the Daulian bird lamenting the death of Itys," is the symbol of grief. And Propertius, reminding himself that his mistress' birthday is at hand, drives away gloom and worry in this wise:

aspiciam nullos hodierna luce dolentes
et Niobae lacrimas supprimat ipse lapis
alcyonum positis requiescant ora querelis,
increpet absumptum nec ^{sua} mater Ityn (2)

And Catullus, in a letter to Hortalus, likens his songs for his brother's death to those of the nightingale:

qualia sub dens^s ramorum concinit umbris
Daulias absumpti fata gemens Ityli (3)

1. Martinengo-Cesaresco: the Outdoor Life in Greek and Roman Poets, London, 1911, p. 159.
2. Prop. 3, 10, 7ff.
3. Cat. 68, 13ff.

Propertius, once more, describes the grief of Cynthia with these illusions:

non tam nocturna volucris funesta quer^ela
Athica Cecropiis obstrepat in foliis
nec tantum Niobe bis sex ad busta superba
sollicito lacrimas defluit a Sipylo ⁽¹⁾

And Ovid makes Sappho write to Phaon:

incubui tetigique locum, qua parte fuisti;
grata prius lacrimas conbibit herba meas
quin etiam rami positⁱis lugere videntur
frondibus, ⁽²⁾ et nullae dulce queruntur aves;

Here branches lay aside their leaves and grieve, in sympathy with Sappho, and birds cease their sweet warbling. And to accentuate further Sappho's mood Ovid continues:

solum virum non ultra pie maestissima mater
concinit Ismarium Daulias ales Ityn
ales Ityn, Sappho desertos cantat amores-
hactenus; ut media cetera nocte silent ⁽³⁾

In the above passage, not content with the effect of the pathetic fallacy in 'quin etiam rami positⁱis lugere videntur frondibus' Ovid works in his favorite symbol of grief: the Daulian bird lamenting Itys. Then, like a painter perfecting the background in a portrait, in the last two lines he brings out the finishing touches of his picture with the striking simplicity and naïveté that is so characteristic of his art: 'The bird sings of Itys, Sappho sings of love abandoned,-that is all: all else is silent as midnight.'

In view of the preceding, I believe that an investigation will prove that such allusions to metamorphosed characters are, among the Latin poets, commonplaces, probably borrowed from Homer (4) or the

1. Prop. 2, 20, 5-9

2. Ovid, Her. 15, 149-256

3. Cf. Ovid, Rem. Am. 606ff.

4. Cf. Homer, Odyssey 19, 513ff.: 'the Daulian bird, etc.'

Alexandrian poets, and are used, for artistic effect, as characteristic symbols to accentuate the emotional setting of a scene.

Ovid, to be sure, makes transformed characters in the Metamorphoses of paramount interest in themselves, and Vergil, in several instances, mentions such ⁱⁿ a realistic manner, sometimes to indicate a portent. (1)

But instances of metamorphosis we must exclude from the limits of the pathetic fallacy, since characters metamorphosed were conceived of in antiquity as the persons they had been rather than the objects they had become, and hence their sympathies and antipathies still seemed real rather than fallacious. In fact the idea of metamorphosis might be construed, on the whole, as an unconscious groping of the imaginative ancient mind to establish a link between the human and brutish or inanimate worlds.

l.e.g. Aen.11,274ff.

Volumes have been written by modern scholars on the subject of oracles, divination and omens of antiquity with the purpose of showing what a significant part they played in the life of the Greeks and Romans. Not only did the untutored believe in divination, but the Stoics found a philosophic justification for it.¹ The flight of birds, the entrails of beasts, rain, thunder, lightning, dreams, -- almost everything was a means of divination. What an abundance of signs, omens and dreams the ancient historians record ! Horace uses them pleasantly enough in his Odes - like much else such things are charming, if one does not believe in them.² but it is abundantly clear that it took an effort to be rid of such belief.³

" Superstition", says Cicero, "follows you up, is hard upon you, pursues you wherever you turn. If you hear a prophet, or an omen; if you sacrifice ; if you catch sight of a bird; if you see a Chaldean or a haruspex; if it lightens, if it thunders, if anything is struck by lightning; if anything like a portent is born or occurs in any way - something or other of the kind must generally be happening so that you can never be at ease and have a quiet mind. The refuge from all our toils and anxieties would seem to be sleep. Yet from sleep itself the most of our cares and terrors come."⁴ The argument of the later Stoics, well summed up by Cicero, is of particular significance here, considering that the Stoic philosophy and religion, for a long time prevalent in Greece, greatly influenced for more than two centuries

1. Cf. Cicero, De Divinatione I., 82-83

2. Cf. Odes, III., 27

3. T. R. Glover, The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire, 1909, p. 17

4. Cf. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, 1911, Chap. XVI.

the entire Roman world. Divination was justified by the Stoics by the doctrine of συμπάθεια τῶν ὅλων or Sympathy of the Whole. This conception, in the main, was as follows: all the world is working together; it is all one living whole, with one soul through it. This soul is Phusis, the life of the world, and, from another point of view, the Law of Nature; "it is the great causation by which all events occur; for the Phusis which shapes things towards their end acts always by the laws of causation. Phusis is not a sort of arbitrary personal goddess, upsetting the natural order; Phusis is the natural order, and nothing happens without a cause. A natural law, yet a natural law which is alive, which is itself life, it becomes indistinguishable from a purpose, the purpose of the great world - process," "..... It approaches our idea of a "definite personal God, and, since it must be in some sense material, it is made up of the finest material there is.... fire....intellectual fire that is present in life, a fire which has consciousness and life, and is not subject to decay. This fire, Phusis, God, is in all creation.

Since Phusis is throughout the world, the world is one great unit, of which no single part can either rejoice or suffer without the rest being affected. A grand conception, the truth of which is illustrated in the ethical world by the feelings of good men, and in the world of natural science -- we moderns may be excused for feeling a little surprise -- by the fact that the stars twinkle. It is because they are so sorry for us: as well they may be! " 1.

1. Cf. Gilbert Murray, The Stoic Philosophy, 1915, pp. 39-43

And so we see that, for Stoics, sympathy runs through all the universe. Why, even the moon sympathizes! Thus Vergil represents the moon as friendly towards the Argives when they rushed from Tenedos to Troy 'amid the friendly silence of the peaceful moon, seeking the well - known shores.'

et iam Argiva phalanx instructis navibus ibat
a Tenedo, tacitae per amica silentia lunae
litora nota petens, flammās cum regia puppis
extulerat, fatisque deum defensūs iniquis
inclusos utero Danaos et pinea furtim
laxat claustra sinon ¹.

How, therefore, not only the supernatural, but particularly Nature, is in Vergil closely allied with human feeling; how the steadfast course of Nature in her familiar road symbolizes that which is familiar and welcome among men; how discord in Nature sympathizes with strange and sad happenings in the human world -- --I shall attempt to show presently in collected evidence.

At present let us pick up the threads of our argument and observe what relation there was between the doctrine of and divination. "What connection has divination with the nature of things?" asks Cicero. "And even if it were united and joined therewith, so as to form one harmonious whole, which I see is the opinion of the natural philosophers and especially of those who say that all things that exist are but one whole; still what correspondence can there be between the order of the universe and the discovery of a treasure? For if an increase of my wealth is indicated by the entrails of a victim, and this fact is a necessary link in the chain of nature, then it follows, in the first place, that we must suppose that the entrails themselves form

other links; and secondly, that my private gain is connected with the nature of things. For the Stoics have collected many cases which they think confirm the notion, as when they assert that the little livers of little mice increase in winter, and that dry pennyroyal flourishes in the coldest weather, ... that the chords of a stringed instrument at times give notes different from their usual ones, ... and that trees lose their vitality as the moon declines, just as they dry up in winter, and that this is the time to cut them. Why need I speak of the seas, and the tides of the ocean, the flow and ebb of which are said to be governed by the moon? and many other examples might be related to prove that some natural subsists between objects apparently remote and incongruous. Antipater, Chrysippus and Poseidonius.. all assert the same proposition -- namely, that the divine and sentient energy which extends through the universe, directs us even in the choice of the victim by whose entrails we are to frame our divinations. And to improve upon this theory, you will agree with them in asserting that at the very instant that the sacrifice is offered, a certain appropriate change takes place in the victim's entrails, so that we can therein discover some signal addition or deficiency, since all things are obedient to the will of the gods." ¹. In brief, there is a certain connection and conjunction of nature (*continuatio coniunctioque naturae*),². a natural sympathy and correspondence in the nature

1. *De Div.*, II., 35

2. *ibid.* II., 142

of things(vis consensusque naturae), ^{1.} which makes possible divination, and that a long continuance of observations has created the art. ^{2.}

Thus we find that the religious atmosphere of the Romans was permeated with such conceptions and usages but in the neighborhood of a skepticism on the part of men like Cicero and Horace, who were probably infrequent as compared with the number of the credulous. Accordingly, in the Roman poets there are countless references to omens and portents many of which are interpretations of natural phenomena. Omens, it should be observed, 'have no significance independent of the will of an observer to accept them, but he must note words, phrases, or acts and apply them consciously in another than their literal sense. Such definite acceptance (accipere omen) ^{3.} is paralleled by definite power of refusal ^{4.} (improbare, exsecrari, refutare, abominari omen).^{5.} At this point let us observe that omens may be therefore 'pathetic', that is, the interpretations may be affected by the mood of the poet or his character.

But even though some interpretations may be both 'pathetic' and fallacious, I shall consider them as transitional, and shall exclude them from the field of the pathetic fallacy proper. For example, Propertius, lamenting the illness of Cynthia:

1. *ibid.* 144

2. *ibid.* 146

3. e. g. Cic. *De Div.*, I., 103

4. Examples are too numerous to be cited here but will be found in the collection of Bulenger in Graevius, *Thes., Ant.*, 5 (1696), 365; 441-452

5. A. S. Pease, *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Divinatione Liber Primus*, 1920, p.286

et iam Luna negat totiens descendere caelo,
nigraque funestum concinit omen avis. 1.

And Ovid makes sad Phyllis say to Demophoon:

pronuba Tisiphone thalamis ululavit in illis,
et cecinit maestum devia carmen avis. 2.

And again Ovid, in the Tristia, sorrowing:

dum loquor et flemus, caelo nitidissimus alto
stella gravis nobis, Lucifer ortus erat. 3.

The owl was usually considered a bad omen:

sedit in adverso nocturnus culmine bubo
funerisque graves addidit ore sonos. 4.

Miracles, too, occur, though they are some times hardly distinguishable from omens and portents and are either 'pathetic', fallacious, or both. An interesting example illustrating at the same time mantic, miracles and the pathetic fallacy, in close connection, may be found in Tibullus: at one time the Sibyls prophesied that a war would come. Then a miracle took place: 'trumpets and the clash of arms were heard in heaven, the sacred groves rang with the coming rout.....and kine found tongue and spake of the coming doom.' And with them even the images of the gods sympathized, for from them 'poured the warm tears!':

haec fore dixerunt belli mala signa cometen,
multus ut in terras deplueretque lapis.

1. Prop. II. 28,37 ff.
2. Ovid, Her. II. 117 ff.
3. Ovid, Tristia, I. 3, 71 ff.
4. Ovid, Ibis, 221

atque tubas atque arma ferunt strepitantia caelo
 audita et lucos praecinuisset fugam:
 et simulacra deum lacrimas fudisse tepentes
 fataque vocales praemonuisse boves.
 ipsum etiam Solem defectum lumine vidit
 iungere pallentes nubilus annus equos. 1.

And Propertius advises Lynceus, passion-tossed for Cynthia,
 to cease from writing on such serious themes as these:

nam rursus licet Aetoli referas Acheloi
 fluxerat ut magno fractus amore liquor,
 atque etiam ut Phrygio fallax Maeandria campo
 errat et ipsa suas decipit unda vias,
 qualis et Adraasti fuerit vocalis Arion,
 tristis ad Archemori funera victor equus. 2.

There are some instances, too, that are on the border line
 between interpretation of human observation and a miracle, as
 when, in the Aeneid, victorious Aeneas forms a procession of his
 vanquished enemies, the Rutulians are overcome with grief, and
 'behind, the war-steed Aethon, his trappings laid aside, goes
 weeping, and big drops wet his face':

post bellator equus positus insignibus Aethon
 it lacrimans guttisque umectat grandibus ora. 3.

1. II. 5, 71 ff.
2. II. 34, 33 ff.
3. XI. 89 ff. Cf. Iliad XVII. 426 ff. where the horses of Achilles weep.

One of the most prominent features of poetic diction is to be observed in the use of the epithet. And particularly in the employing of personifying epithets, that is, in such epithets as are commonly applicable only to persons, the pathetic fallacy is not infrequently to be observed: since the poet often applies to inanimate or brute objects or phenomena in nature epithets that are peculiarly descriptive of his own temporary moods or emotions.

But we must be careful to recognize such personifying epithets as are not so much descriptive of some temporary mood or emotion as of a clearly defined and permanent state of mind or attitude towards certain objects. Such epithets, which I may call 'faded', are almost invariably applied to particular objects at all times, as are, for example, the epithets usually applied to the sea. We may recognize a 'faded' epithet when we are aware that the poet employs it while he is in a natural or contemplative state of mind and is clearly not influenced by any mood or emotion, as in the case of Horace, who, regarding the sea, 'certainly leaves the reader in no doubt as to his opinion'.¹ Says he:


non est meum, si mugiat Africis
malus procellis, ad miseras preces
decurrere et votis pacisci,
ne Cypriae Tyriaeque merces

addant avaro divitias mari ².

This aspect of the 'greedy' or 'cruel' sea -- the sea is very commonly invested with life -- as the enemy of man is

1. Hodnett, The Sea in Roman Poetry, p. 52

2. Odes III. 29, 57-61



prominent in almost every author, and the feeling toward the sea most often to be inferred is a sense of this power and cruelty, a feeling of dread and at the same time of the fascination which may accompany such dread. Figuratively, the sea usually represents misfortune, and human cares and trouble are often represented as waves. ^{1.} To be sure, says Lucretius, 'the waves of the sea smile', ^{2.} but man should not trust them. After a shipwreck 'the face of the sea laughs treacherously'. ^{3.}

But in the case of poets who allude to the sea with various epithets expressing nearly every aspect, it is somewhat difficult to recognize a 'faded' epithet or determine a pathetic fallacy, as when Attis addressing his companion:

aliena quae petentes velut exules loca celeri
sectam meam executae duce mihi comites
rapidum salum tulistis truculentaque pelage
et corpus evirastis Veneris nimio odio,
hilarate erae citatis erroribus animum. ^{4.}

There may be a slight hint of the sympathetic fallacy here: 'rapidum'(1.16) may mean 'restless' or 'impetuous' as reflected from 'exules'(1.14.), 'celeri'(1.14.) and 'citatis'erroribus'(1.18.). The sea here is 'truculenta' = 'savage' or 'cruel', and the epithet is hardly a 'faded' one but may express here something of the antipathetic fallacy: considering that in Catullus the 'calm' and 'dazzling' sea is not without representation. ^{5.} Fear was, to be sure, the pervading element in the Roman feeling for the sea, ^{6.} and although it is difficult to estimate the poetry of the early Republic, we find there such

1. Cf. Vergil, Aen. IV., 532.

2. I., 100

3. ibid., II., 652-561

4. Cat., LXIII., 14-18

5. Cf. LXIV., 269; LXIV., 14; LXIV., 7; XXXVI., 11

6. Hodnett, The Sea in Roman Poetry, Master's thesis, 1918, p.10

stereotyped epithets as 'minax', 'avidus', 'infidus', 'subdolus', 'horridus', 'immisericors', 'immanis', etc., clearly indicating the Roman conventional attitude towards it.^{1.}

On the whole, it seems to me, we must be guided not only by our knowledge of a poet's style of diction but also of his mental traits and personality if we attempt to distinguish 'faded' epithets from those expressing the pathetic fallacy.

Such 'faded' epithets as, for example, those applied to the sea by certain poets as indicative of their personal attitude towards it -- who comprise, according to Miss Hodnett's excellent study, all of the pre-Augustan excepting Catullus, and the Augustan poets excepting Virgil and Ovid -- I shall exclude from my consideration of the pathetic fallacy. In the case of epithets applied to other objects it is more difficult to draw hard and fast lines between 'faded' and fresh epithets.

Another kind of epithet which may be mistaken as an indication of the pathetic fallacy is the transferred epithet, that is, an epithet transferred from a person to some object towards which he bears some relation in the context. But very often distinction of the transferred epithet from the regular personifying epithet is necessarily arbitrary. I shall therefore consider as transferred epithets only such as are transferred from a person to some object towards which he bears a decidedly personal relation as, for example, his clothes, bed, etc.

1. Id., p. 25

A few examples:

Hermione, sorrowing, in a letter to Orestes mentions incidentally her 'sorrowing' bed;

nox ubi me thalamis ululantem et acerba gementem
condidit in maesto procubuique toro. 1.

And Ovid, in exile, describes his illness: he is pale, emaciated, sorrowing:

nec vires adimit Veneris damnosa voluptas:
non solet in maestos illa venire toros. 2.

Ovid attributes his forced flight even to his ship:

et Scythicum profuga scindere puppe fretum. 3.

And, in another place:

accedam profugae sarcina parva rati. 4.

But in the first book of the Aeneid Vergil describes the harbor where the 'wearied sons of Aeneas' 5. 'wearied of their lot', 6. take refuge. 'Here', says Vergil, 'no fetters imprison weary ships':

hic fessas non vincula navis
ulla tenent unco non alligat ancora morsu. 7.

The poet here reflects in the ships the state of mind

1. Ovid, Her. VIII., 107 ff.
2. Ex Ponto I., 10, 33 ff.
3. Tristia V., 2, 82
4. ibid., I., 3, 84
5. I., 157
6. I., 177
7. I., 168 ff.

and body of the sons of Aeneas. If the sons of Aeneas had themselves, instead of Vergil, ascribed their own state of mind and body to their ships, this might probably have been merely a transferred epithet. The 'weary' ships is obviously a pathetic interpretation of the 'creaking and groaning' of the ships as they were anchored in the harbor.

Sometimes, too, the Roman poets employ a noun like 'ship' or 'land' not as an object but as a poetic expression signifying persons who presumably occupy the land or ship, as in the following rhetorical question:

quid, ferus Andromachae lecto cum surgeret Hector ?
bella Mycenaeae non timuere rates ? 1.

Here 'the Mycenaean ships' obviously refer to the men who occupied them. To ascribe fear and trembling to men is not, of course, fallacious. Such instances are certainly to be excluded from the limits of the pathetic fallacy.

An interesting example of a figurative reference to persons that may easily be mistaken for the pathetic fallacy I have found in the Tristia. Ovid describes his last night in Rome, before departing for Tomi, his place of exile. Depicting the grief of his wife and household, 'every corner', he says, 'in the house has its share of tears':

inque domo lacrimas angulus omnis habet. 2.

Very probably Ovid here refers to persons who might have been sitting or standing in the corners of the rooms.

1. Prop. II., 22, 31 ff.
2. I., 324

Besides, one often finds verbs originally suggesting the presence of emotion on the part of the subject, but which have in the course of time lost their emotional significance. For example, 'queror', originally meaning 'to lament', had become to mean merely to 'coo' or 'warble':

fons sacer in medio speluncaque pumice¹pendens,
et latere ex omni dulce queruntur aves.

This I think may be explained as follows: every bird was considered symbolically, at least by poets, as representing some person who had been metamorphosed, after a tragic experience, and who was, therefore, forever doomed to utter emotional expression symbolic of his experience. Thus, the nightingale, 'forever lamenting', it was imagined, 'the death of Itys', had been, according to one version, Aëdon, a Theban queen, who, jealously attempting to kill her brother-in-law Amphion's eldest son, by mistake killed her own son. Itylus, and was changed by Zeus into a bird.² Hence the song was imaginatively construed as a lament and was usually expressed by the verb 'queror', in even the most realistic or prosaic descriptions, the original meaning of which, as applied to birds, having faded. By whom it was used for the first time in the sense of 'to warble' or to 'coo' is difficult to ascertain.

Another verb of 'faded' meaning is 'remugire', 'to bellow back', as in this 'lover's complaint':

audio quo strepitu ianua, quo nemus
inter pulchra satum tela remugiat
ventis.³

1. Amores III., 1, 3 ff.
2. Cf. Walters, Classical Dictionary, 1916, p. 20
3. Horace III., 10, 5 ff.



Perhaps 'faded', too, is 'gemere' or 'congemere', to groan, as when a tree was being cut down by woodsmen, in a simile emphasizing the destruction of Troy:

volneribus donec paulatim evicta supremum
congemuit traxitque iugis avolsa ruinam. 1.

This may also be a curious transferred pathetic fallacy: Vergil perhaps implies that Aeneas groaned as he described the destruction of Troy, or that perhaps Troy groaned as she tottered, but he transfers the 'pathetic' verb to the simile, thus interpreting the creaking of a tree as it falls.

But Hero, in her letter to Leander, describes her drowsy mood and ascribes her sleepiness also to her lamp;

namque sub aurora, iam dormitante lucerna
somnia quo cerni tempore vera solent,
stamina de digitis cecidere sopore remissis,
collaque pulvino nostra ferendi dedi. 2.

This is a premeditated pathetic fallacy: in the interpretation of the flickering and sputtering of the lamp by the personifying epithet 'dormitante', Ovid consciously accentuates the mood of Hero. At the same time, from the character's viewpoint, Hero, filled with anxiety for Leander and with the terror of a dream she is about to relate, imagines the reflection of her mood in the lamp. En passant, it is interesting to note that the sputtering of a lamp was considered a bad omen, and is therefore here cleverly brought in obviously to supply a sympathetic atmosphere in connection with the dream which Hero is about to relate and interpret as a bad omen.

1. Vergil, Aen. II. 630 ff.

2. Ovid, Her. XIX. 195 ff.

And now, to sum up the main points in the argument of this lengthy but, I feel, necessary introduction: I have attempted to show that Dr. Shairp's belief, mentioned in the beginning of this study, that the expression of the pathetic fallacy 'is keeping true to a fact of human nature' has strong foundation. And that this is even more true regarding Latin poetry not only because it is natural for some poets to express the pathetic fallacy when under the influence of some poignant mood or violent emotion, but also because:

I. The time during which there existed a belief in animism, that is, a spontaneous attribution of life to Nature, and hence concomitant human expression, could not have been so far distant from any period in Roman history. The revival, therefore, of this belief, which I have termed Animization, by Roman poets may be considered a characteristic of Latin poetry that was to some extent borrowed from the Alexandrian, and which paved the way for the expression of the pathetic fallacy.

II. The culture of mythology and particularly the idea of metamorphosis may be construed as an unconscious groping of the ancient imagination to establish a link between the human and brutish or inanimate worlds.

III. This link was finally realized to some extent in the Stoic doctrine of *συμπάθεια*.

The body of my evidence will afford a view of the occurrence^r of the pathetic fallacy in Roman poetry, from Ennius through the Augustan Age, to determine, in so far as the evidence of the occurrence of the pathetic fallacy in each author, the literary epoch in which the author wrote, and his characteristic personal traits, allow (1) a most probable conjecture of the emotional temper of the different Roman poets whose works are extant; and (2) the purpose of the use of the pathetic fallacy, that is, a differentiation of such fallacies as are stock forms, borrowed probably from the Alexandrian poets, from those which give the appearance of originality, and (3) the nature of the use of the fallacy.

Note. As I had not developed the idea of the antipathetic fallacy until after I had completed my collection of material, my evidence of this fallacy will be necessarily incomplete.

The Pre-Ciceronian Period

The Comic Poets

Inasmuch as the pathetic fallacy is primarily a poetic form, we need not be surprised to find practically no evidence of it in the comic poets, Plautus and Terence, who were termed 'poets' by the ancients probably by virtue only of having written in verse, according to the view of Horace, who asserts that poetry depends not upon metre alone, but it is such a composition as will, by its diction, proclaim itself poetic, even if the metre is broken up by a transposition of the words. Satire and comedy, he maintains, in which people are made to talk very much as in ordinary life, are not poetry. ¹.

But even in prose writing there may sometimes appear a poetic strain, if perhaps only for comic effect. there is, for example, in Plautus an instance of what may be called an anticipated pathetic fallacy. In the opening scene of the Miles Gloriosus Pyrgopolinices, a villainous captain of Ephesus, addressing his henchman Artotrogus bids him take care that the lustre of his shield is 'more bright than the rays of the sun are wont to be at the time when the sky is clear, so that when the occasion comes....it may dazzle the eyesight of the enemy.' 'And', he continues, 'he wishes to console his sabre that it may not lament nor be downcast in spirits....since it longs right dreadfully to havoc of the enemy':

1. Cf. Horace, Satires, I. 4

nam ego hanc machaeram mihi consulari volo,
 ne lamentetur neve animum despondeat,
 quia se iam pridem feriatam gestitem,
 quae misera gestit fartem facere ex hostibus 1.

The fallacy becomes intelligible if we suppose, as it is plausible, that the speaker thus mirrors his own longing 'to make havoc of the enemy', and is himself 'downcast in spirits' because he could not do so.

In the earliest Roman poets it is in most cases impossible to obtain conclusive evidence of the pathetic fallacy, since the fragmentary nature of the material compels the investigator to withhold his decisions because of a lack of context. What evidence there is can not be explained, therefore, too confidently.

There is perhaps, one instance of the sympathetic fallacy in Pacuvius:

profectione laeti piscium lasciviam intuentur,
 nec tuendi satietas capier potest 2.

The sailors, happy in their departure, see their joy reflected in the playfulness of the fishes..

Perhaps, too, in Accius (33) there is a possible indication, in a negative way, of a sense of kinship between man and nature in 'the pitiless waves':

flucti immisericordes iacere taetra ad saxa adlidere.

1. Plautus, Miles Gloriosus, 5 ff.

2. B. 265

The Ciceronian Period

In Lucretius, too, the evidence is almost negligible. There are not a few metaphorical expressions that at first sight give the impression of the fallacy as, for example, in his invocation to Venus at the opening of Book I.

tibi rident aequora ponti
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum. 1.

I believe there is little likelihood, however, that in 'rident' Lucretius mirrors anything other than the conventional mood a poet is wont to adopt when invoking Venus. But in Book IV. he describes the gamut of feelings and emotions which an impetuous lover experiences. Deluded he, to imagine that his mistress's daintily-polished shoes smile at him!

unguenta et pulchra in pedibus Sicyonia rident 2.

'Of the sympathetic or sentimental view of nature there seems to be little trace in Lucretius', finally observes one writer.^{3.} But there is one sentimental element in Lucretius that is, I believe peculiarly modern. He introduces it immediately in his prooemium:

nam simul ac species genitabilis aura favoni
aeriae primum volucres te, diva, tuumque
significant initum percussae corda tua vi.
inde ferae pecudes persultant pabula laeta
et rapidos tranant amnis: ita capta lepore
te sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis.

1. De Rerum Natura, I. 8 ff. Cf. also II. 559; V. 1005; III. 22

2. II. 1125

3. Allen, The Treatment of Nature in the Poetry of the Republic, Madison, Wis., 1898, p. 1886.

denique per maria ac montis fluvisque rapacis
frondiferasque domos avium camposque virentis
efficis ut cupide generatim saecula propagent
quae quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas
nec sine te quicquam dias in luminis oras
exoritur neque fit laetum neque amabile laetum. 1.

The above sentiment rests upon the fancy that "springtime is the season of romance in all creation; in spring the trees and flowers bud, the birds skip and sing and mate, and--here is the vital point--

'In spring the young man's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of love.'²

This pretty fancy that the nightingale and the rose feel in the springtime the very same impulses as the poet re-established a sympathy between man and nature and thus disclosed a limitless source of emotion. But when such a bond is once established through supposed fellowship in joy and suffering the aesthetic sense also finds room to play. And in this case man attributes to nature not mere sensation, as in the case of animization, but the one vital and universal passion.

But Lucretius was not the only classical Latin poet to express this conceit or 'pathetic' fancy, notwithstanding Tenney Frank's assertion that 'the suggestion of Lucretius had to await the spirit of mediaevalism' and that 'the rationalistic Roman recognized the sentiment as fantastic....and had little patience with this momentary outburst of Lucretius.'³ For Vergil later expressed the same feeling just as poignantly in his Georgics:

1. I. 10-23


2. Tenney Frank, in Class. Jour., Vol. XI., May 1916, p. 488

3. ibid., p. 489

In the spring 'the rooks joyous with some strange unwonted delight chatter to each other amid the leaves. Glad are they, the rains over, to see once more their little brood and sweet nests, ... now their hearts conceive new impresses, other than they felt when the wind was chasing the clouds.... Hence that chorus of the birds in the fields, the gladness of the cattle, and the exultant cry of the rooks.' ¹. In spring, again, 'Heaven comes down in fruitful showers into the lap of his joyous spouse, and his might, with her might commingling, nurtures all growths.... the herds renew their loves the fields loosen their bosoms.... the grasses safely dare to trust themselves to face new suns; the vine-tendrils fear not the rising of the South or the storms of the North, but thrust forth their buds and unfold all their leaves.' ². This sentiment which reflects his own love for every living thing Vergil sums up in three words--'amor omnibus idem.' ³.

Lucretius however, was obviously the first Latin poet to express this sentiment which later clearly had so deep an influence on Vergil, although their respective philosophic views of nature were widely different, and still later, on the unknown author of the Pervigilium Veneris, a romantically colored poem of the later Empire. Hence Lucretius appears to me in an unusual but brilliant light: his true spirit seems to force itself out regardless of his philosophy. In this light he appears not so much a propounder

1. I. 410 ff.
2. II. 325 ff.
3. III. 244



of the Epicurean philosophy as preeminently a poet of intense feeling and emotion--a poet who, despite his materialistic philosophy and the conservative literary creed of his day, was so intensely given to expressing his mystical nature that, even in the treatment of a subject defined only by the intellect, he expressed the mystic and emotional elements which, in modern times became so prominent a characteristic of the French and English poets of the nineteenth century.

The pathetic fallacy is more frequent in Catullus than in any other poet of the Republican period. Throughout the Attis and the Peleus and Thetis nature is in sympathy with the mood of the suffering human being. The fallacy is usually artificial, and is clearly lacking in the spontaneity that characterizes Catullus's shorter poems. It is more than probable that this premeditated adaptation of nature was borrowed by Catullus from Alexandrian models, although we have not the models to verify this conjecture. In his longer poems the pathetic fallacy is most prominent. The sea-shore and the sea are made, for artistic effect, to enhance the loneliness of the scenes in the laments of Ariadne and of Attis. The latter gazes in the direction of his lost home and yearns for it 'looking upon the lonely sea with tearful eyes':

ibi maria vasta visens lacrimantia oculis
patriam allocuta maestast ita voce miseriter. 1.

Ovid and, to some extent, Catullus are characterized by the premeditated or artificial use of the pathetic fallacy, and spontaneous instances, though they occur, seem comparatively rare.

Propertius's use is, in the main, natural and spontaneous, quite in keeping with the general nature of his poetry. It is, furthermore of such a character as is peculiarly harmonious with the very modern romantic view of aesthetics, a view which, I believe, maintains that the truly beautiful defies definition or classification and is revealed only in the light of impression that is necessarily subjective.

Further, to quote Professor Postgate: "In the employment of sentiment Propertius is modern and even romantic. The personal feeling which is so predominant in his poems is reflected upon inanimate objects and external events: they are transfigured, so to speak, in a human mirror. His fancy often assumes a modern shape when swayed by the pathetic fallacy." (1)

1. Postgate furnishes several examples of the pathetic fallacy, one of which he explains as follows: "Thus in V. 11, 42 'labe mea vestros erubuisse focos' (and note) the fire's red light appears to the poet as a blush of shame." Again, he explains another pathetic fallacy: "the Parthian arrows are gladdened by blood IV. 12, 11, 'tua Medae laetentur caede sagittae.'" But the fallacy does not exist, if we quote the entire sentence:

illa quidem interea fama tabescet inani,
haec tua ne virtus fiat amara tibi
heve tua Medae laetentur caede sagittae,
ferreus aurato neu catasphractus equo.

'She will pine.... for fear....lest the median arrows rejoice in thy death or the railed soldier on his gilded steed.' The last part of the sentence appears to indicate that in 'sagittae' there is a case of metonymy: not the arrows, but those who shoot them is here meant. To impute the emotion of joy to the Medes is not, of course, fallacious.

So too Ariadne, abandoned by Theseus, climbs to the hilltop and thence gazes upon the lonely waves of the sea (1) and feels herself hopelessly abandoned, hemmed in by the waters, (2) where no mortal appears upon the empty seaweed, (3) and she stands by the lonely sea, and while its waves sweep up the beach, within her own heart "great waves of sorrow roll". (4)

On the contrary, Catullus calls upon the waves of his lake to rejoice with him upon his return to Sirmio. Here the poet wishes his joy to be reflected in the ripples of the waters on the lake bordering on his estate, and in the laughter of his "home":

Salve, o venusta Sirmio, atque ero gaude:
gaudete vosque, o Lydiae lacus undae:
ridete, quidquid est domi cacchinorum. (5)

And the stars are called on as witnesses and perhaps sympathizers with the loves of men (6) The obverse of this feeling is brought out where Catullus contrasts the coming and going of the bright days (soles) with their short intermission of night, and his own brief season of happiness, to be followed by perpetual night. (7) An interesting example of an antipathetic fallacy is the following: the daughter of Minos weeps in grief, and the waves respond in play:

1. LXIV.127ff.
2. LXIV., 184ff.
3. LXIV., 168ff .
4. LXIV., 62ff.
5. XXI., 1ff.
6. VII. 7ff.
7. V., 4ff.

ipsius ante pedes fluctus salis adludabant.(1)

And when Chiron brings flowers "cheered with whose grateful odour the house smiled in gladness":

quo permulsa domus iucundo risit odore(2)

But Ariadne, abandoned by Theseus and distracted with woe, is impatient with the inhumaneness of nature: "why should I cry in vain to the senseless airs--the airs that are endowed with no feeling, and can neither hear nor return the messages of my voice?"

(3) "But how murderous," says she, "the tract of sea which separates my kin from me!" She demands vengeance, and Jupiter nods assent: the earth and stormy seas tremble, and the heavens shake the quivering stars! (4)

It is in the Peleus and Thetis that the largest proportion of the description of nature is found, and that the traces of the pathetic fallacy are most evident.

But in Catullus the pathetic fallacies are largely premeditated--they seem to partake of the artificiality of the other portions of the poem. They lack the spontaneity that characterizes all phases of Catullus' shorter poems, and all references to nature in Lucretius, and though we have not Catullus' Alexandrian models, we may surmise that to them must partly be laid the use of nature characteristic of this poem. Had this attitude

1. LXIV., 67 ff.
2. LXIV., 284 ff.
3. LXIV., 164 ff.
4. LXIV., 179 ff.

toward nature been purely natural to the Roman poet, he would surely have shown more of it in the briefer poems in which his own feelings are so strongly and freely expressed. But his interests were in man rather than nature, and it seems to be only under outside influence that he cares to use nature in any way to deepen and enhance the expression of feelings.

The Augustan Age.

Vergil.

It is almost trite to remark that the noble arts flourish best in an atmosphere of freedom and wealth and tranquility. And no literary epoch so clearly demonstrates this truism as the Augustan Age which may well be extended over nearly sixty years, and which forms a singularly well-defined epoch in literary art. The Augustans "gave expression to the weariness and longing for rest, to the revival of Roman and Italian feeling, to the pride of the empire, the charm of ancient memories and associations, the aspirations after a better life and a firmer faith; and all these feelings are made subordinate to the personal glory of Augustus who stands out as the central and commanding figure in all their representations."⁽¹⁾

By far the most imposing poetic figure of this Age was Vergil who reached the maturity of his powers in the treatment of the Aeneid, the greatest subject possible for his time. The charm Vergil exerted over his countrymen was so intense because he was the reviver of the early poetry of Greece and the first creator of the early romance of Italy. Yet his permanent value lies in the fact that he was one of the great interpreters of the secret of nature and the meaning of life.

The difference between Vergil and Homer, even where they describe the same natural objects or where the Latin poet borrows his similies directly from the Greek is quite obvious: in Vergil gone is the clear, majestic calm, the classic serenity and perfect simplicity of Homer. But Vergil takes the outward world into his

1. Sellar, Roman Poets of the Augustan Age, Vergil, 1883, p.14

heart, and colors it with his own melancholy, which Saint Beade calls "demi tristesse". In Vergil, as in no other Roman poet, Nature is really human--too human. She lends herself to human joys and sorrows and, like a bright deep pool, reveals in her depths images of human moods, emotions, passions. This sympathy between man and Nature, Vergil felt and expressed more poignantly than any other Roman poet; and in this, as in so many other things, we find in him an anticipation of modern times. "As compared with Lucretius, Vergil deals with nature in a less sublime, but more human way. Lucretius demands the explanation of Nature and her processes; Vergil seems to enter into her feeling, to catch her sentiment!"(1)

This perception of a sympathy between the feelings and vicissitudes of man and the world that surrounds him appears nowhere so strongly as in the Aeneid, and particularly throughout the fourth book there is maintained a fine sympathy between the aspects of the outer world and the passions which agitate the human actors.

"In the Georgics and Aeneid, as well as in the Eclogues, Vergil shows a susceptibility to the beauty and power of Nature. But Nature presents different aspects and awakens a different class of feelings in these poems. In the Eclogues he shows a great openness and receptivity of mind, through which all the softer and more delicate influences of the outer world enter into and become part of his being.....In the Georgics, the sense of the relation of Nature to human energy imparts greater nobleness to the conception. She appears there, not only in her majesty and beauty but as endowed with a soul and will. She stands to man at first in the relation of an antagonist: but, by compliance with her conditions, he subdues her to his will and finds in her at last

a just and beneficent helpmate."(1)

One of the most prominent characteristics in the Georgics and Eclorues is Animization which I defined and illustrated in the introduction to this study. The force, too, of many of the epithets applied to material objects, such as "ignava", "laeta et fortia", "maligni", "infelix", etc. consists in the suggestion of a kind of personal life underlying and animating the silent processes of Nature.

In the Eclogues Nature seems actually to live and speak. She mourns for the dear Caesar, as in Greek poetry she mourned for the dead Daphnis. The very pines, springs and orchards call for the absent Tityrus:

mirabar, quid maesta deos, Amarylli, vocares
cui pendere sua patereris in arbore poma
Tityrus hinc aberat, ipsaete, Tityre, pinus,
ipsi te fontes, ipsa haec arbusta vocabant. (2)

All Nature now mourns at the death, now rejoices at the apotheosis, of Daphnis. (3) And now she smiles, but if fair Alexis should depart you will see the very rivers dry:

omnia nunc rident: at si formosus Alexis
montibus his abeat, videas et flumina sicca. (4)

When Phyllis is absent the country is parched, the grass is athirst, dying; but at the coming of Phyllis the woods will be green and Jupiter will descend in "joyful rain":

aret ager, vitis moriens sitit aeris herba,
Liber pampineas invidit collibus umbras:
Phyllidis adventu nostrae nemus omne virebit,

1. Sellar, p. 164
2. 36 ff.
3. V. p. 18
4. VII., 55-56

Juppiter et laeto descendet pluribus Inbri (1)

When Daphnis gazes up at the heavens, Caesar's star makes the fields rejoice in their fruitage, and the grapes on the hills find their color:

Daphni, quid antiquos signorum suspicis ortus?
ecce Dionaei processit Caesaris astrum,
astrum, quo segetes gauderent frugibus et quo
duceret apricis in collibus uva colorem. (2)

By his pleas Moeris puts off the longing of Lycidas: the whole sea-plain lies still and silent, and every breath of the murmuring breeze is dead:

causando nostros in longum ducis amores
et nunc omne tibi stratum silet aequor, et omnes,
aspice, ventosi ceciderunt murmuris aurse. (3)

In the tenth Eclogue, Vergil shows such deep sympathy for Callus that all Nature grieves.⁽⁴⁾ But it is when the black south wind rises, "saddening the sky with chilly rain" ⁽⁵⁾ that we see the natural melancholy of Vergil. And when a plague strikes the earth, "sadly goes the plowman and unyokes the steer sorrowing for his brother's death". ⁽⁶⁾

One of the most elaborate instances of the pathetic fallacy (probably of Alexandrian origin): Orpheus rages for the loss of his bride Eurydice. She is hastening headlong along the river, and a monstrous serpent is awaiting her near by while all Nature weeps:

at chorus aequalis Dryadum clamore supremos

1. VII., 57-60

2. IX. 46-49

3. X., 56-59

4. V. p. 7

5. Georgics, III. 278 6. III., 518.

implerunt montis; flerunt Rhodopeiae arces
 atque Pangaea et Rhesi Mavortia tellus
 atque Cetae atque Hebrus et Actias Orithyia

But Orpheus sang only of Eurydice, as he sat on the lonely shore,
 alone, at the coming and the going of the day:

ipse dava solans aegrum testudine anorem
 te, dulcis coniunx, te solo in litore secum
 te veniente die, te decedente canebat. (1)

And when Orpheus, poor wretch, regains his love only to lose her
 again, for seven whole months by lonely Strymon's wave he wept
 and unfolded his tale, charming the tigers and making the oaks
 attend his strain: even as the mourning nightingale, bewailing
 the loss of her brood, weeps all night long, filling the region
 with sad laments.

qualis populea mæcreus philomela sub umbra
 amissos queritur fetus, quos durus arator
 observans nido implumis detraxit; at illa
 olêt noctem, ramoque sedens miserabile carmen
 integrat, et maestis late loca questibus implet. (2)

Especially at the time of the composition of the Aeneid, the spi-
 rit of Stoic pantheism is closely allied to Vergil's sense of mys-
 ticism and "sympathy for nature." Wordsworth, of the modern
 poets, has well expressed that spirit.

a sense sublime

Of something far more deeply interfused
 Whose dwelling is the light of setting sun
 And the sound ocean and the living air,
 And the blue sky and in the mind of man. (3)

And this note Vergil clearly sounds in his sixth book:

1. IV., 460-466
2. IV., 511-515
- 3.

spiritus in us alit, totaque infusa per artus
mens agiteat molem (1)

And in Vergil this is not a mere studied philosophy but a reflection of the inner spirit of the poet himself as well as of his personal philosophy. Tenney Frank is not of course correct in saying, regarding Vergil, that "stoicism could never become a personal religion, a gripping human emotion".(2) For in perhaps no other Latin work(3) of the Republic or Empire, as in the Aeneid does the Stoic doctrine of $\sigma\upsilon\pi\eta\rho\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ so deeply and so consistently characterize the life of Nature. Indeed, Nature is the kind friend of man; she shares his loves, his fears. Lucretius desired to wrest her secret from her, but Vergil actually became her friend and confidant. There is moreover, a beneficent purpose in the world, Vergil suggested, and the force which moves Nature is akin to ourselves. And not only Nature, but even the supernatural is closely allied with human feeling. Hence the fallacy Vergil employs is usually sympathetic, but sometimes antipathetic.

Thus, the ships of the weary sons of Aeneas are weary, too,(4) and the Argives move to Tenedos amid the friendly silence of the peaceful noon.(5) As Dido, overcome with sorrow, prays for death, the lonely owl with ill-boding son oft complains, drawing out its lingering notes into a wail.(6) Tottering Troy is like a tree groaning as it crashes to the ground. (7) Achilles hurls the Tro-

1. Aen. VI., 126 pp.

2. Frank, Fortunatus et Ille, in Class. Jour. XI., 1916, p. 485

3. This assertion covers only the periods extending through the Augustan Age.

4. I., 157.

5. II., 255.

6. IV., 462.

7. II., 631.

jans into a panic, the choked rivers groan and Xanthus cannot find his way or roll out to sea.(1) As for Gallus and Daphnis in the Eclogues, so in the Aeneid, Nature weeps for the fallen Umbro:

sed non Dardaniae medicuri cuspis ictum
evaluit neque eum iuvare in volnere cunctus
somniaferi et Marsis quaesitae montibus herbae
te nemus Angitia, vitrea te Fucinus unda,
te liquidi flevere lacus. (2)

When Turnus kills Bitias in battle the earth groans:

conlapsa ruunt immania membra,
dat tellus gemitum et clipeum super intonat ingens(3)

She groans, too, when Aeneas and Turnus clash.(4) And when blood-stained Mars gives rein to his frenzied steeds, utmost Thrace moans with the beat of their hoofs.(5) As the grieving Rutulians form the procession of victorious Aeneas, an old war horse weeps as he follows behind them.(6) Mezentius, too, filled with grief, addresses his grieving steed.(7)

Nature often reflects human dread. Thus, as Hecate comes to open the way, Aeneas is frightened, the ground rumbles and wooded ridges quiver.(8) And when, from the pinnacle, the goddess sang the shepherd's signal, straining her hellish voice to the horn, the groves tremble and the woods echo. The nere of Diana hears it afar off, as does the river Nar and the Veline founts. The trem-

1. VI., 806.
2. VII. 756.
3. IX., 708.
4. XII., 713.
5. XII., 335 ff.
6. XI., 89 ff.
7. X., 860 ff.
8. VI. 225 ff.

bling mothers hear it and press their children to their breasts.⁽¹⁾

Nature quakes with terror at the exploits of Hercules, when, mad with rage, he shakes to pieces a rock of flint:

dissultant ripae refluit que exterritus amnis⁽²⁾

And when the Salii extol the deeds of Hercules in song, they sing:

"Before thee the Stygian lakes trembled."⁽³⁾ As Aeneas rushes forth with spear in hand, the startled earth trembles, and a cold shudder runs through the Ansonians.⁽⁴⁾ When Aeneas sets sail from Carthage overhead looms a black cloud: the wave shudders dark-ling:

olli caeruleus supra caput adstitit imber,
noctem hiememque ferens, et inhorruit unda tenebris⁽⁵⁾

Victorious Pallas gazes down upon the revelling flames, in which his own joy is reflected:

ille sedens victor flamas despectat ovantis⁽⁶⁾

Quite frequently a fallacy may be either sympathetic or anti-sympathetic, depending upon the point of view assumed. Thus, Polydorus' shade, overcome with grief and pain, bids Aeneas flee from the cruel land, the greedy shore of Thrace.⁽⁷⁾ Of evil intention and hostile character are the approaches and woods where Turnus lies in ambush:

1. VII., 512 ff.

VIII., 240

3. VIII., 298

4. XIII., 445

5. V., 11.

6. X. 409

7. V. p. 6

Est curvo anfractu valles, accomoda fraudi (522)
 armorumque dolis, quam densis frondibus atrum
 urget utrimque latus tenuis quo serita ducit
 angustaeque ferunt fauces aditusque maligni (525)
 hanc super in speculis summoque in vertice montis
 planities ignota iacet tutique receptus,
 sen dextra laevaue velis occurrere pugnae,
 sive instare iugis et grandia volvere saxa (530)
 huc invenis nota fertur regione viarum
 arripuitque locum et silvis in sedit iniquis. (1)

Thus "maligni" (525) reflects the evil intention, and is sympathetic with the feeling, of Turnus towards Aeneas, and "iniquis" (532) reflects Turnus' hostility. On the other hand, from the point of view of Aeneas, whose mind is greatly upset, all the surroundings seems suspicious--antipathetic. (2) And when, later, Turnus engages in combat with Aeneas, alas, his treacherous sword snaps. (3) And, as he dies, he smites the hostile earth with bloodstained mouth. (4) "I trust Aeneas to the treacherous breezes?" (5) exclaims Palinurus.

When Aeneas in Thrace plucks at the roots of shrubbery he struggles against resisting sands, (6) and later he greedily plucks and breaks off a reluctant--so he imagined--golden bough. (7) And Juno, when Latinus was bidden to proclaim war on the sons of Aeneas, with her own hand breaks in the delaying doors. (8)

Beroe laments that the Trojans must chase a fleeing Italy, (9) and later, Aeneas, invokes Phoebus, exclaiming: "now at last we grasp the shores of fleeing Italy !" (10) When Aeneas sets sail on the Tiber: the waves and woods look on in wonder:

1. XI., 522-531

2. H.R. Fairclough, in the Loeb, Class. Lib. edition, 1908, translates "iniquis" by "perilous" and adds: "i.e. involving peril for Aeneas."

3. XII., 731

4. X., 488

5. V., 844

6. V. p. 6

7. VI., 210

9. V., 629

8. VII., 620

10. VI., 611

labitur uncta vadis abies; mirantur et undae,
miratur nemus insuetum fulgentia longe
scuta virum fluvio pictasque iuvare casinas. (1)

Again, Nature acts as a prophetess, as when, for example, at the marriage of Dido, and Aeneas, she prophesies the impending catastrophe:

interea magno misceri murmure caelum
incipit; insequitur commixta grandine nimbus,
et Tyrii comites passim et Troiana inventus
Dardaniusque nepos Veneris diversa per agros
tectata metu petiere; ruunt de montibus amnes.
Speluncam Dido dux et Troianus eandem
deveniunt, prima et Tellus et pronuba Iuno
dant Signum; fulsere ignes et conscius aether
connubiis, summoque ulularunt vertice Nymphae,
ille dies primus leti priusque malorum
causa fuit neque enim specie famave movetur
neciam furtivum Dido meditatur amorem;
coniugium vocat; hoc praetexit nomine culpam. (2)

Yet Nature does not always sympathize; she sometimes follows her own straight course: all is peace and quiet, but not so Dido: she is sleepless and heaves with a mighty tide of passion. (3)
And Nature, like man, responds to divinity: When Zeus speaks, the gods grow silent, heaven and the zephyrs are hushed, and earth trembles from her base. (4)

In the *Lydia*, a poem sometimes attributed to Vergil, the poet envies the fields and meadows because his mistress Lydia plays upon them. This is a sympathetic fallacy that merges into a somewhat opposite feeling. With her whom the poet loves Nature, too, will fall in love: the woods, meadows, springs will all rejoice:

gaudebunt silvae, gaudebunt mollia prata,
et gelidi fontes, aviumque silentia fient

1. VIII. 91 ff.
2. V. p. 10
3. IV., 160-172
4. X., 100 ff.

tardabunt rivi labentes (sistite lymphæ):
 dum mea incundas exponat cura querelas. (1)

Thus the poet sings, while his "dying limbs are wasting with grief,
 steeped in the chill of death!"(2) because his mistress is absent:

"O moon, thou knowest what grief is: pity one who grieves"(3)....

Unhappy I, who was not born in those days when Nature was kind!(4)

1. 16-20
2. 22-24
3. 42
4. 76

Horace and Tibullus

We are not surprised not to find the slightest trace of the pathetic fallacy in Horace. As Professor Harrington points out, Horace was 'the most carefully polished, the most laboriously concise, the most artfully naive of the Roman poets, who taught Rome to appreciate Greek models of lyric verse in abounding variety.' ¹. And, to be sure, he was a poet not only of good humor but of good sense, and was a good example of the sophisticated Roman. Surely, he believed, between Nature and man lay a deep gulf. As a believer in the Epicurean philosophy, what else was Nature but a concourse of atoms or elements that must be understood and mastered? Yet he was a good lover of the country--as he was also of wine--and particularly of his own Sabine farm which he immortalized in song.

"More minute analysis of his preferences in describing nature phenomena shows unusual interest in the winds and the sea, less appreciation of day and night. Fire, the stars, rain, and the seasons have impressed him less than we should have expected." ². But of the pathetic fallacy there is not unnaturally no trace.

A search to discover what Tibullus saw, what he loved to see, and what it meant to him, is, however, somewhat disappointing, particularly since it would appear that as one of the elegiac poets, who were on the whole rather introspective as well as the poets of their own moods, one would on a priori grounds expect him to exhibit a considerable amount of description of nature, some of it tinged, perhaps, with his own moods and feelings.

1. K. P. Harrington, Horace as a Nature Poet, P. A.P.A. (1904) vol. 35, p.6

2. *ibid.*

"The epithets he employs are the faded conventional ones: 'soft garlands', 'yellow grain', 'snow-white sheep', 'cruel wild beasts', 'caerulean waves', 'pitiless winds'. Although a few passages betray some love of nature's beauty, even these are rather monotonous and empty of real feeling."

Says Professor H. V. Canter; "Tibullus is so thoroughly Roman that his writings are free from the chief characteristics of Alexanderian poetry: emotion, mythology, metonymy, excessive metaphor."² Perhaps, too, the fact that he is free from the pathetic fallacy is a further indication of the typical Roman character; but if such is the case, most of the great Latin poets covered in this thesis were, in the main, obviously not typically Roman.

1. K. P. Harrington, Tibullus as a Poet of Nature, PAPA (1900) Vol.31, p.35
2. In lecture, University of Illinois, Dec.2,1921.

Propertius

None of the elegiac poets has been so varyingly estimated as Propertius. But, of late, scholars and critics have been more or less unanimous in asserting his greatness. Propertius's poems show lofty imagination, fiery eagerness, nervous vigor. He is feverishly self-conscious, displays poetic daring and irregular brilliance, although he violates, at times, good taste, good sense, and sane proportion.

His personality is clearly revealed by his poetic style and diction. He displays a habitual melancholy, and was of a sickly, nervous disposition--a restless, tormented soul. His make-up was indeed strange and solitary: he expressed a morbid self-consciousness, a longing for sympathy, a feeble will, a foreboding gloom, a deficiency in self control and self-restraint. On the other hand, he was amiable, and as his chief merits, possessed a capacity for gentleness and tenderness; his most serious defects were irresolution and inconstancy. Postgate ¹. tells us that his personal traits are clearly revealed by an examination of his language. The redundant and unusual use of personal pronouns denotes his self-consciousness. The excessive use of such words as tam, tantus, tot, totiens, etc., involve a reference to personal knowledge and a feeling for others. The frequent use of such adjectives as ignotus, extremus, insolitus, etc., show a repulsion of mind that recoils from the strange and the unknown. A melancholy and almost tearful disposition is shown by the frequency in which such words as lacrimae, tristis and flere occur. Allusions to death and the grave are apparent: bustum, fata, cinis, favilla, funus, manes,
 1. Cf. Postgate, Introduction to Propertius, 1885, pp. 38-44

mors, pulvis, ossa, rogus, torus, sepulcrum. His weakness of will is seen in his free use of potentials and the paraphrases of syntax and thought. In general, Propertius prefers the potential to the actual: the aim, desire, etc., impressed him far more than the completed result. His very free use of the pluperfect and other completed tenses, as well as the periphrastic and future, seems to show that he shrank from contemplating reality face to face: he relegated it so far as he could into the buried past or formless future. And in his use of the pathetic fallacy we may further read his character: his constant grief of, his terror and almost tearful disposition he reflects in inanimate objects and objects of nature.

The most elaborate pathetic fallacy is a paraclausithyron, a lament to the door of his indifferent mistress. The poet lapses now into the antipathetic, ¹. now into the sympathetic fallacy: the door is 'cruel', 'pitiless', 'unrelenting'; the portals are 'grim', and 'mute'; the threshold is 'chill'. But for him, the midnight, the stars and the chill breeze grieve as they behold him prostrate:

Janua vel domina penitus crude^lior ipsa,
 quid mihi iam duris, clausa taces foribus?
 cur numquam reserata meos admittis amores,
 nescia furtivas reddere mota preces?
 nullane finis erit nostro concessa dolori,
 turpis et in tepido limine somnus erit?

1. Cf. H. V. Canter, The Paraclausithyron as a Literary Theme, in Am. Jour. Phil., Vol. 41, part 4, 1920, p.355. This is a more or less conventional attitude of irate lovers.

me mediae noctes, me sidera prona iacentem,
 firgidaque Eoo me dolet aura gelu:
 tu sola humanos numquam miserata dolores
 respondes tacitis mutua cardinibus. 1.

And he exhorts Lygdamus to describe his mistress Cynthia's grief which, he hopes, should have been caused by his absence. So anxious is he to satisfy his curiosity that he imputes the emotion to her dark-hued robe:

ac maestam teneris vestem pendere lacertis,
 scriniaque ad lecti clausa iacere pedes?
 tristis erat domus, et tristes sua pensa ministrae
 carpebant 2.

And Calliope, in a dream, advises him not to concern himself with the poetic glorification of military achievements, such as, for example, the victory of Caesar over Ariovistus, 'when the wild Rhine, steeped with the Swabian's blood bears mangled bodies down its sorrowing waves':

barbarus aut Suevo perfusus sanguine Rhenus
 saucia maerenti corpora vectet aqua. 3.

Later Propertus strives to free himself from his passion for Cynthia: 'Farewell to the thresholds still weeping with my plaint':

limina iam nostris valeant lacrimantia verbis 4.

Ovid, too, expresses himself in like manner, but he avoids the fallacy: 'See how the door has been made wet with my tears':

uda sit ut lacrimis ianua facta meis 5.

1. I. 16, 17-26
2. III. 6, 13-17
3. III. 3, 45
4. III. 29, 9
5. Am. I. 6, 18

And Properius represents Arethusa, pining for her absent soldier-husband, as reflecting her plaint in the whine of her puppy and in the hoot of the night owl:

Craugidos et catulae vox est mihi grata querentis:
illa tui partem vindicat una toro.

and:

sive in finitimo g²ruit stans noctua tigno,
seu voluit tangi parca lucerna. mero 1.

In one of his aetiological poems, recalling how Aeneas bore his trembling father on his shoulders through burning Tröy, the poet reflects in the flames Anchises's fear, as well as, perhaps, the human awe for so worthy a deed: the flames fear to burn the hero's shoulders:

cum pater in nati trepidus cervice pependit,
et verita est umeros urere flamma pios 2.

And in a sudden apostrophe to Cleopatra, he exclaims: 'Yet didst thou fly, O queen, to the wandering streams of timorous Nile':

fugisti tamen in timidi vaga flumina Nili 3.

Here, the fear and flight of Cleopatra and her fleet is reflected in the swift-flowing Nile.

1. IV. 3, 55-56 and 59-60

2. IV. 1, 45-44

3. III. 11, 51

Propertius poignantly expresses his unwillingness to travel by sea by imputing his own state of mind to the sea itself:

a pereat, quicumque rates et vela paravit
perimus et invito gurgite fecit iter. 1.

And, in an attempt to treat a theme like the one used by Ovid in the Fasti, he begins to feel a lack of confidence. His lyre, unaccustomed to such strains, seems unwilling:

accersis lacrimas cantans; aversus Apollo;
poscis ab invita verba pigenda lyra. 2.

His dread and hatred for Acanthis, Cynthia's keeper, is reflected, at the old woman's death resulting from a chill, in the shivering of the broken shed wherein she lay:

vidi ego rugoso tussim concrescere collo,
sputaque per dentes ire sruenta cavos,
atque animam in tegetes putrem exspirare paternas:
horruit argenti pergula curta foco. 3.

Propertius is disturbed by the heartlessness of Cynthia. He recalls how overcome with grief was Calypso after the departure of Odysseus: she wept to the lonely waste of the waves (sympathetic), and moaning with locks unkempt, she uttered many a plaint to the cruel, the unjust sea (antipathetic):

at non sic ithaci digressu mota calypso
desertis olim fleverat aequoribus
multos illa dies incomptis maestis capillis
sederat, iniusto multa locuta salo. 4.

1. I. 17, 13-14
2. IV. 1, 73-74
3. IV. 5, 66-70
4. I. 15, 9-12



Propertius, in a drunken stupor, approaching his sleeping Cynthia is impatient with the 'officious' moon playing upon her with its beams:


donec diversas praecurrens mota Calypso
luna moraturis sedula luminibus l.

In the perils of a storm at sea the poet laments his folly in leaving Cynthia: he cries to the 'lonely sea-mews', and his prayers fall idly on a 'heartless shore'; the winds aid Cynthia's cruelty, and the gale howls fierce threats in his ear. Let the dark night and 'threatening shoals' be enough punishment! Perish the man who first voyaged over the 'unwilling deep'. ². Propertius now gives vent to the sympathetic, now to the antipathetic fallacy. Bereft of Cynthia, he is lonely: all nature is lonely and deserted. But he must make his moan -- if only the lone crags can keep faith! And ye trees and founts witness my Cynthia's cruelty! ³.

Perhaps the most sincere, pathetic, and spontaneous of Propertius's elegies is a sympathetic ^{letter} probably written to comfort the sorrowing mother of the ill-fated youth Paetus who lost his life at sea. Propertius is completely overcome with emotion, and the poem is one long antipathetic fallacy: 'oh, money, source of many woes, 'tis thou hast o'erwhelmed Paetus with raging waters; thou givest men's vices cruel nourishment. Nature is treacherous -- with guile hath she made a path for greed!

natura insidians pontum substravit avaris (37)

1. I. 3, 31-32
2. I. 17
3. I. 18



Ah, cruel North wind! (13) Poor Paetus did the wild night see borne
on a slender plank: so many ill^s conspired for the death of
Paetus:

hunc parvo ferri vidit nox improba ligno:
Paetus ut occideret tot coiere mala. 1.

Finally, the examples quoted above seem to bear out the truth of Sellar's statement: "Propertius forces the Latin language from its ordinary obedience to grammatical laws and its ordinary sobriety of phrase to be the medium of an imagination working powerfully, incessantly, and irregularly under the influence of powerful, unceasing, and irregular emotion. The language of Propertius is the idealised monologue of an introspective mind, making its meaning vividly present to itself, as that of Ovid is the idealized conversation addressed to a pleasure-loving, refined, and quick-witted society." 2. Propertius, I may add, may be said to possess, besides his intimate familiarity with all the conflicting elements of human passion and the deeper sources of melancholy in human life, more than almost any ancient poet a sympathy with nature in her lonely desolate scenes, an antipathy for her tempestuous forces, an appreciation of the soothing effects of her softness and beauty.

1. III. 7, 53-4

2. Sellar, Horace and the Elegiac Poets, 1899, p.307

Ovid.

In Ovid the pathetic fallacy occurs with considerable frequency, it is usually artificial, in keeping with the poet's style as a whole, and is lacking in the spontaneity of its use by Propertius as well as in the less spontaneous but more philosophic use of it by Vergil in the Aeneid. Ovid's use of this fallacy has contributed greatly to the progress of his artificiality, and shows that he has not only all the arts of the rhetorician at his command, but also the benefit of all that has preceded him in Roman literature, as well as in that of Greece:(1) No Latin author has borrowed so freely and extensively from his contemporaries and immediate predecessors as Ovid,(2) who, among other things, artistically adopted instances of the pathetic fallacy from his Greek and Roman forerunners. The Alexandrian origin of his Metamorphoses, as well as of much of the content of his other writings is a matter of reasonable certainty, and, I believe a study of Hellenistic parallels would reveal his debt to Greek literature in the use he made of the pathetic fallacy.

Ovid's elaborate fallacy in the representation of Nature's grief at the death of Orpheus is not dissimilar to Vergil's description of Nature's grief at the threatening danger to Eurydice. But Ovid is not reserved in his presentation: in the Metamorphoses Nature grieves more intensely and more completely than in any work of his predecessors. Hence, not only do the mountains and towers weep, as in Vergil, but the birds, beasts, rocks, trees, rivers--and his very lyre weeps, in Ovid, for Orpheus:

1. Zielinski in Philologus, Vol. 64(1905), p. 16
2. Rand in T.A.P.A., Vol. 35 (1904), pp. 143 ff.

Te maestae volucres, Orpheus, te turba ferarum,
 te rixidi silices, te carrinae saepe secutae
 fleverunt silvae, positis te frondibus arbor
 tonsa coras luxit; lacrimis quoque flumina licunt
 increvisse suis, obstrusaque carbasa pullo
 naides et dryades passosque habuere capillos.
 membra iacent diversa locis, caput, Hebre, lyranque
 excipis: et (mirum!) medio dum labitur amne,
 flebit nescio quid queritur lyro, flebite lingua
 murrurat exanimis, respondent flebiterripae (1)

A further indication of Ovid's artificial use of the pathetic fallacy may be seen in the studied repetition of the same fallacy in several instances: In her letter to Phaon, Sappho is made to imagine that the trees, as in the passage last quoted, "lay aside their leaves and grieve" in sympathy with her:

quin etiam rami positis lugere videntur
 frondibus, et nullae dulce queruntur aves (2)

a leafless tree being a symbol of grief. (3) And even in such a pseudo-didactic work as the Remedium Amoris (4) he digresses to refer to Nature's lament at the death of Phyllis, a theme which Vergil, too, treated in his Eclogues. (5)

And yet, whether or not Ovid was himself a man of deep feeling and emotion, in his works, at least, he never loses sight of the realm of feeling--it is because he possesses to a great extent the creative imagination which clothes inanimate things with personality, calls forth him who is far distant or long since dead, so grasps the hidden relations between objects that the name of one suggests the other, sees resemblances between seemingly unlike things and uses these to enhance the beauty, the clear-

1. Met XI., 45 ff.
2. Her. XV., 152 ff.
3. e.g. Met XIII., 324
4. Rem. Am. 606 ff.
5. V. p.

ness, the strength, either or all, of a given locution. Ovid even makes the sound of words reproduce their sense so that in all situations, he not merely describes a scene as done, but sees and hears and feels it in the doing. In short, of all Roman poets, Ovid is, I believe, the most consummate artist in the field of literary technique and human psychology. It is moreover, easy to observe how well he realized the aesthetic significance of the pathetic fallacy, and with what artistic skill he strove for and to a great extent attained ^{its} perfection. But, in an attempt to show how far Ovid drew from, and perhaps improved on, the themes and literary technique of his predecessors, we must be careful at the same time not to underestimate his originality.

As in his predecessors, in Ovid, too, the emotions of grief and sorrow claim a considerable number of instances of the pathetic fallacy. He describes how a tempest arose in the Ionian sea during his voyage to Tomi,, and the very ship groaned responsively to his woes:

pinæ texta sonant, pulsi stridore rudentes,
ingemit et nostris ipsa carina malis. (1)

He sends his book, personified, to Rome. It is represented in neglected and sordid attire, and as wandering through various parts of the city and praying to Augustus to pardon the poet, pining in exile. Ovid represents his shaking and tremulous fear, his white and lifeless color, and his dread as reflected in the writing:

me miserum! vereorque locum vereorque potentem,
et quatitur rapido littera nostra metu.
aspicis exsangui chartam palloræ colore?
aspicis alternos intremuisse pedes?

And he pictures in the Metamorphoses Aethaea's struggle between mother-love for her son and that fierce clan-love for her brothers, whom Meleager, her son had slain. As her love for her brothers wins, "turning away her face, with trembling hand she throws the fatal billet into the flames: The brand either gave or seemed to give a groan as it was caught and consumed by the unwilling fire":

aut dedit aut visus genitus aut ipse dedisse
stipes, ut invitis correptus ab ignibus arsit(1)

And while Pan, failing to catch Syrinx, sighed in disappointment, the soft air stirring in the reeds gave forth a low and complaining sound:

dumque ibi suspirat, motos in harunde ventos
effecine sorum tenuem similemque querenti(2)

In the Fasti: the exiled poet digresses to remind Germanicus that cold Sulmo was his native place. There is something pathetic in this digression and in the poet's allusion to the immense distance that then separated him from it--"But", he interrupts, "suppress thy complaints, my Muse; sacred subjects must not be sung to a sorrowing lyre":

Sulmonis gelidi, patriae, Germanice, nostrae.
me miserum, Scythico quam procul illa solo est!
Ergo age tam longas sed supprime, Musa, querellas:
non tibi sunt caesta sacra canenda lyra. (3)

And a soldier's horse when a scourge comes upon the earth, "forgetting his former glory, groans in his stall, doomed to an in-

1. Met. VIII, 513 ff.
2. Met. I., 707 ff.
3. Fasti, IV., 81 ff.

glorious death". (1)

Ovid, often represents his heroines, grieving and abandoned by their lovers giving vent to the antipathetic fallacy. When Adriadne climbs a cliff, scanning the horizon as she searches for sight of Theseus, she "finds the winds cruel, too." (2) And "Oh faithless bed--the greater part of my being, oh, where is he? ...Cruel were her slumbers, the winds and breezes "eager to start" her "tears"!

crudeles somni, quid me tenuistis inertem?
aut semel aeterna nocte premeunda fui
vos quoque crudeles, venti, unumque parati
flaminae in lacrimas officiosa meas.
dextera crudelis, quae me frat se que necavit,
et data poscenti, nomen inane, fides!
in me iurarunt somnus ventusque fidesque
proditum sum caesis una puella tribus! (3)

But she lapses into the sympathetic fallacy, ^{urging} Theseus to tell, (4)
when he returns to his home, of her, abandoned on a "lonely shore"

When the poet's tablets, sent to his mistress, return to him with gloomy news that she is unwilling to see him, he vents his disappointment on them. "Away, ill natured tablets, funereal pieces of wood!"

Ite hinc, difficiles, funebria ligna, tabellae,
tuque, nequaturis cera referta notis! (5)

At one time, Ovid's mind, sad and despairing sees Nature devitalized: he asks the sun to be pointed out to him. He does not see Nature at all:

tristitiae causam si quis cognoscere quaerit,

1. Met. VII., 542 ff.

2. Her. X, 29

3. Her. X., 111-118

4. 129

5. Amores XI., 7 ff.

ostendi solen postulat ille sibi,
nec frondem in silvis nec aperto mollis prato
gramina, nec pleno flumine cernit aquam. (1)

Leander, pining in grief for Hero wrote that "for the seventh night"--space longer than a year to him--he had not slept: the "troubled" sea, the "raging" deep has been boiling with hoarse-voiced waters:

septima nox agitur, spatium mihi longius anno,
sollicitum raucis ut mare fervet aquis
his ego si vidi mulcentem pectora somnum
noctibus, insani sit mora longa freti! (2)

He essayed to swim across to her, but "wind and wave denied" him "everything": (3) Why must my heart be troubled as oft as the sea is troubled?"(4) "I envy Phrixus, whom the ram with gold in its wooly fleece bore safely over the sad seas."(5) But he tries again to swim across, and he imagines, at times he can almost touch her with his hand. "But oft, alas! this "almost" starts my tears. What else than this was the catching at elusive fruits, and pursuing with the lips the hope of a retreating stream?"

velle quid est aluid fugientia prendere poma
spemque suo refugi fluminis ore sequi. (6)

But, in spite of the turbulent sea, he must swim to her, even though he will lose his life in the attempt. And such an omen of his death, he ventures to imagine, will no doubt offend her and stir her displeasure: "I cease--no more complain; but, that the sea, too, may end its anger, add, I beseech, your prayers to mine":

1. Tristia X., 4, 7 ff.
2. Her. XVIII., 25 ff.
3. Ibid., 53
4. Ibid., 129
5. Ibid., 143
6. Her. XVIII., 180 ff.

desino parcequeri! sed ut et mare finiat iram,
accedant, quaeso, fac tua vota meis. (1)

Just a brief space of calm. Then will I be slow to swim, then
will I beware, nor cast revilement on the deaf floods again, nor
complain that the sea is harsh when I fain would swim:"

nec faciam surdis convicia fluctibus ulla
triste nataturo nec queror esse fretum (2)

Hero, too, pining for Leander is troubled because, even when
the heavy wave has a little laid aside its fierce mood, her lo-
ver could come, but will not":

aut, ubi saevitiae paulum traxis unda remisit,
posse quidem, sed te nolle venire, queror (3)

And she imagines the storm is jealous of her and beats her lover
back; that is why he does not come:

quoque minus venias, invida pugnat hiemps (4)

Then she lapses into the sympathetic fallacy: she falls asleep
before dawn, "just when her lamp was falling asleep", (5)

And again, as Ariadne wanders aimlessly, calling the name of
Theseus, her desire for him is too powerful to be felt by her
alone: so it is quite natural for her to imagine that the very
place experienced her desire and "felt the will to bring her aid":
thus she unconsciously interprets the echo of her voice:

1. Ibid. 203-204

2. Ibid. 211-212

3. Her. XIX., 23-24

4. Ibid. 120

5. V. p. 43

interea toto clamanti litore "Theseu!"
 redebant nomen concipere saxa tuum,
 et quatiens ego te, totiens locus ipse vocabat.
 ipse locus miserae ferre volebat opem (1)

And Ovid's "weary " bark carries him, an exile, on his journey to Tonic, touching on the way Samos:

inde levi vento Zerynthia litora nacta
 Threiciam tetigit fessa carina Samon (2)

When the player is sorrowing, his lyre, too, is unresponsive, "unwilling":

et Linon in silvis idem pater "aelinon" altis
 dicitur invita concinuisse lyra. (3).

The excited lover, in Ovid, often imagines that even inanimate objects are jealous of him (antipathetic), at the same time reflecting his own jealousy: "Oh, envious wrap, to cover such pretty limbs!"

invida vestis eras, quae tam bona crura tegebas
 quoque magis spectes--invida vestis eras! (4)

And the lovers, Pyramus and Thisbe, appealed to the "envious" wall that separated them. "How small a thing, it would be to be to open, O wall, for our kiss!"

"invide" dicebant "paries, quid amantibus oestas.
 quantum erat, ut sineres toto nos corpore iungi (5)
 aut, hoc si minimum est, vel ad oscula danda pateres?"

1. Her. X. 21 ff.

2. Thistia I. 10, 19

3. Amores III., 9 23

4. Am. III., 2, 27

5. Met. IV. 73 ff.

Filled with wonder at the origin of ships and sailing, Ovid supposes that the "waves looked on in wonder" when the Argo first set sail:

Prima malas docuit mirantibus aequoris, undis
Peliaco pinus vertice caesa vias! (1)

When Medea went forth, desiring to renew Aeson's span of life, "all alone she wandered out into the deep stillness of midnight." All Nature was mute, silent, unresponsive: "only the stars twinkled." She invokes all the gods of the groves and of night: "with your help when I have willed it, the streams have run back of their fountain-heads, while the banks wondered:

quorum ope, cum volui, ripis mirantibus omnes
in fontis rediere suos, (2)

And she continued, "I have need of juices to renew old age: and you will give me them: for not in vain have the stars gleamed in reply!" (3)

"I am now surprised," writes Ovid during his voyage to Tomi "that amid such billowy conflicts both of my spirit and of the sea, my genius did not vanish. If I gain my port, by that very port I shall be frightened; the shore has more horrors for me than the hostile waves. And although the sea be agitated by wintry storms, yet is my breast more agitated than the sea itself." Thus, to Ovid, the storm battles and rages because he dares to write, while it hurls its threats:

1. Am. II. 11 ff.
2. Met. VII., 199
3. Ibid., 217

improba pugnat hiemps indignaturque, quod ausim
scribere se rigidas incutiente minas
vincat hiemps hominem! sed eodem tempore, quaeso,
ipse modum statuat carminis, illa sui (1)

1. Tristia I., II el ff.

Conclusion.

As I have shown in my evidence, Lucretius and, perhaps even in a greater degree, both Horace and Tibullus, are the only classical poets of the period investigated of whom more than fragments are extant, who do not make some appreciable use of the pathetic fallacy. The other Latin poets whom I have treated were either wholly or partly influenced by their Alexandrian predecessors, as was probably the case with Catullus, and more than probably with Vergil, Propertius and Ovid, in each case, of course, in varying degree.

As we have seen the close connection of the pathetic fallacy with the belief in animism, with mythology and the idea of metamorphosis, (the latter being largely of Alexandrian development), it is therefore not unlikely to suppose a priori that the use of the pathetic fallacy reached a concomitant development during the Alexandrian period, and that the fallacy was one of the by-products of that part of the Alexandrian literary tradition and atmosphere which was adopted by the Roman poets.

The direct influence of this culture upon Vergil's earlier works is a generally recognized fact, and a recent investigator has traced the indirect influence of a literary atmosphere, charged with Alexandrian elements, upon Vergil's later work, the Aeneid.⁽¹⁾ That Vergil, in his earlier works, adopted the Theocritean style of the pathetic fallacy, will become obvious from the following: where, in Theocritus, all nature mourns for Daphnis:

"For him the jackals, him the wolves did lament;
for him did even the lion of the thicket roar, when he was dead..."

1. Cf. Eleanor S. Duckett, Influence of Alexandrian Poetry upon the Aeneid in Class. Jour. Vol. XI., March 1916 pp. 335-347

Many the kine about his feet, many the bulls, and many the heifers and the young steers which bellowed their lament." (1) Conversely, Nature is supposed to rejoice at the approach of the loved one:

"There does the ewe, there do the goats bear twins; there the bees fill full the hives, and oaks are loftier where fair Milon sets his foot. But alas, if he depart, lean is the shepherd then, and lean the pastures." "Everywhere is spring, everywhere fresh pastures, the cow's udders are swollen with milk and the young are nourished, wheresoever lovely Nais wanders." (2)

And in Bion:

"I wait for Adonis; beauteous Adonis is dead...Around that youth, indeed, faithful hounds whine....All mountains and the oaks say 'Alas for Adonis'. And rivers sorrow for the woes of Aphrodite, and springs on the mountains weep for her Adonis, and flowers redden from grief....., since he is dead, ay, all flowers have become withered". (3)

In Callimachus, too, Nature is transformed into gold at Apollo's birth, or fears the wrath of Ares; the river rejoices in Artemis and the sea keeps silence before Apollo. (4) So in the Aeneid Nature weeps for the loss of the fallen Umbro, and quakes with terror at the exploits of Hercules.

As in Theocritus and Bion Nature mourns for Daphnis and Adonis, so in Vergil's Eclogues she mourns for the dear Caesar, for the deserted Gallus, and, in the Georgics, for the endangered

1. Idyl I., 71-75
2. Idyl VIII., 45-48
3. Idyl I.
4. Cf. Duckett, p. 338



Eurydice. And as in the Greek poets Nature responds joyfully to the presence and conversely to the absence, of the loved one, so does she, in the Eclogues, react to the presence and absence of Alexis and Phyllis.

Ovid, too, in his Metamorphoses, imagines Nature affected in like manner at the death of Orpheus, although the heroines of his love-letters find nature very "cruel."

Consequently, I believe a further comparison of Alexandrian and Latin parallels would show that the pathetic fallacy is, in the main, an Alexandrian characteristic that was adopted and notably perfected, along with other peculiarities of the Alexandrian tradition, by certain Roman poets. That the expression of the fallacy, is in the main, not typical of the classical character, either Roman or Greek, becomes evident when we consider that the Roman poets who are free from Alexandrian, but perhaps not from classical Greek, influence are noticeably free also from the fallacy, whereas the opposite holds true in the case of those who are clearly influenced by the Alexandrian tradition.

Because of the flexible nature of the pathetic fallacy, I find that its relative occurrence is not of so great significance as the clear view of the nature or type of the fallacy in the different poets. We have seen that the fallacy is more or less common to Vergil, Propertius and Ovid. It is also present, but in a much lesser degree, in Catullus.

Vergil's use may be said to be, on the whole, philosophic, that is, in harmony with the doctrine of *σοφιστική*. There may be some instances that are perhaps spontaneous but distinction in such cases can only seem unavoidably subjective.

Finally, the romantic origin and effect, therefore, of the pathetic fallacy in Latin poetry, and perhaps even in all poetry, I believe may be traced to the Alexandrian period of culture and refinement when the genuine mythology of Greece reached its highest development, an age which believed in natural magic, in the transformation of men and women into birds and beasts and trees and flowers, and in the existence of life in all objects of Nature.

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